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This study focuses on examining two main issues related to economic growth in 
developing economies. First, the study investigates as to whether or not there is any 
systematic relationship between foreign official development assistance inflows (FDA) 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into developing economies. In order to 
investigate this issue, this study undertook an empirical study by employing panel 
framework for a sample of developing economies. The results of the study show that the 
relationship between aggregate FDA and FDI is ambiguous. Multilateral FDA has a 
negative impact on FDI inflows, whereas bilateral FDA positively affects FDI inflows. 
Furthermore, the empirical results suggest that government investment in infrastructure, 
external openness, and government institutions are important determinants of FDI 
inflows into developing economies. These findings indicate that the overall incentive 
structure of the economy that hosts FDI is the key for attracting FDI. 
The second objective of this study was to examine the mechanism(s) through 
which government institutions and external openness foster economic growth. Effects of 
government institutions and openness on growth are derived using a three sector model in 
the Neo-Classical growth framework that was supported by an empirical investigation 
using dynamic panel framework. According to the theoretical formulation, FDI, trade, 
and government institutions exhibit positive spillover and externalities onto the domestic 
economy, thereby leading to productivity improvements and economic growth. Empirical 
results of panel study show that FDI unambiguously positively impact on economic 
growth. The government institutions, trade, and FDI inflows positively contribute to 
economic growth in developing economies. A case study on Sri Lanka strongly supports 
vii 
the theoretical as well as empirical findings. The study also attempts to explain the role of 
endogenous institutions and external openness through a growth model. According to the 
set-up of the model, the government institutions and external openness induce incentives 
for undertaking R&D works by reducing rent-seeking activities and hence tend to foster 
economic growth. The results show that the economies devote more resources to building 
institutions, maintaining favorable external economic policies tend to increase R&D and 
to maintain higher growth.  
According to the findings of the thesis, government institutions and external 
openness are complementary determinants of economic growth. The main policy 
implication emerging from the findings of the study is that the developing economies 
must have to devote resources to improve the strengths of government institutions, and to 
adopt more open external economic regimes both for attracting FDI as well as for 
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1. 1. Background of the Research 
One of the most central questions in economics over the years has been why some 
countries are poor than the others. A vast majority of economies in the world today are 
seemingly experiencing economic destitution whereas a few countries are experiencing 
the fruits of prosperity. Economists have endeavored to explore the nature and the causes 
of economic growth for explaining the path to prosperity. As a result, numerous 
determinants of economic growth have been established in macroeconomic growth theory 
and policy. There has seemingly been increased attention on the role of foreign 
investment, openness and institutions in growth. Though recent developments of this 
literature have generated insights relevant for explaining the general characteristics of 
developing economies, the extended research is necessary in this area. This thesis studies 
the role of foreign investment inflows, government institutions, external openness and 
their interaction in economic growth pertaining to developing economies.  
 
1. 2. Statement of the Research Problems 
Foreign investment inflows have always been emphasized as being one of the 
main drivers of economic growth in developing economies. A few rapidly growing 
countries, especially the newly industrializing economies, have attracted a greater share 
of private foreign investment whereas a bulk of developing countries have relied on 
foreign public sources for financing development for the last few decades. Most 
developing countries with poor economic conditions and severe macroeconomic 
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problems have tended to seek foreign official development assistance (FDA) from 
multilateral as well as bilateral sources for financing development since private foreign 
investment has not been adequately forthcoming into such economies. This motivates one 
to ponder whether FDA plays an informational role for private foreign investment. In 
searching for the potential host economies, foreign investors appear to be using FDA to 
detect the investment climates for increasing investment. Conversely, investment 
originating countries may be using FDA as an instrument for developing trade and 
investment relations with developing countries. This provides the motivation to explore 
the connection between FDA and FDI inflows in developing countries. Though there are 
studies explaining the possible relationship between FDA and private capital inflows 
ending up with inconclusive results, there is avenue for further scrutiny for uncovering 
the relationship between FDA and FDI inflows.  
This provides the motivation for formulating the following research question so as 
to uncover the possible link between FDA and FDI inflows in developing economies: 
 
Question-1: Is there any systematic relationship between foreign official development 
assistance inflows and foreign direct investment inflows?  
 
There has seemingly been an unresolved controversy over the importance of 
external openness and government institutions in fostering economic growth. While some 
argue that institutions are fundamental determinants of growth devaluing the role of 
external openness, others argue in favour of a greater role for external openness. 
However, both external openness and government institutions appear to be crucially 
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important for fostering economic growth. Government institutions appear to be vital for 
the well-functioning of the market economy. Strengths of government institutions are 
manifested by such things as property rights, rule of law, ethnic and social harmony, and 
the bureaucracy. They tend to generate externalities and spillovers. External openness is 
likely to generate positive externalities and increase productivity by offering greater 
economies of scale, alleviating foreign exchange constraints, transferring labour skills 
into the domestic economy, diffusing technology through foreign capital and intermediate 
goods. Seemingly, there are feedbacks between external openness and government 
institutions. Though the existing literature has generated important insights, the empirics 
of the relationship between government institutions, external openness, their interactions 
and economic growth are inconclusive, whereas the theoretical literature is still at the 
fledgling stage. This gives the motivation for studying the role of external openness and 
government institutions in economic growth. The study formulates the following research 
question. 
 
Question-2: Do government institutions and external openness play a critical role in 
economic growth? What are the likely mechanism(s) through which they could stimulate 
economic growth?  
 
1. 3. The Outline 
The research issues raised above are addressed in four analytical chapters. 
Theoretical formulations are also undertaken. The empirical techniques used in the 
analysis are presented and discussed in the respective chapters. 
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Chapter-2:- Sources of Economic Growth: A Review of Existing Ideas 
 This chapter briefly reviews the existing literature on the sources of economic 
growth. The review focuses on recent developments with specific attention to their 
relevance for developing countries.  
 
Chapter-3:- Assessing the Impact of Foreign Official Development Assistance on 
Foreign Direct Investment: An Empirical Study 
This chapter attempts to explain whether FDA inflows impact on FDI inflows in 
developing countries focusing on the incentive structure of the host economies. 
Aggregated as well as disaggregated data for FDA is used in the analysis. The dynamic 
panel framework is employed for a sample of developing countries. While studying the 
relationship between FDA and FDI, the thesis will mainly focus on the incentive structure 
necessary for attracting FDI inflows into developing countries. 
 
Chapter-4:- Effects of Government Institutions, External Openness and Foreign 
Direct Investment on Economic Growth: A Theoretical Formulation and a Cross-
Country Empirical Study 
An empirically employable growth equation is derived from a three-sector model 
to explain possible channels though which external openness and government institutions 
foster economic growth. The theoretical model focuses on explaining inter-sectoral 
externalities as a channel through which external openness and government institutions 
affect growth. An empirical investigation is, then, undertaken using dynamic panel 
techniques drawing data for a sample of developing economies.   
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Chapter-5:- Endogenous Government Institutions and External Openness in a 
Growth Model 
In this chapter, an existing R&D based growth model is modified to explain the 
role of endogenous external openness and government institutions in economic growth. It 
focuses on explaining as to whether or not external openness and government institutions 
tend to contribute to reducing rent-seeking and foster innovations leading to economic 
growth.   
 
Chapter-6:- In Quest for Puzzling Growth Performance in Sri Lanka: A Case Study 
In order to relate the cross-country empirical findings of this study into a case of a 
particular developing country, this chapter reviews the growth experience of Sri Lanka. 
Being relatively a market-oriented and outward-oriented economy and a liberal 
democracy with relatively improved institutions, Sri Lanka provides a good case for 
studying the relationship between government institutions, external openness and 
economic growth in a developing country setup.  
 
Chapter-7:- Policy Implication 
This chapter summarizes the findings of the study and then presents the policy 
implication relevant for developing countries. The exercise reiterates that the developing 
countries must improve the incentive structure for attracting FDI. It then proposes that 
developing countries need to adopt a growth strategy consisting of strong government 




SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A REVIEW OF EXISTING 
INDEAS 
2.1. Classical Views 
Since the era of classical economists, many researchers have sought to discover 
what makes a nation wealthy. Adam Smith argued in that growth was caused by 
increasing either of the factors such as land, labour, and machinery. The impact of labour 
on growth is induced by more efficient machinery. Increases in the workforce derived 
from increasing returns resulting from growing specialization tend to increase wealth. 
Physical capital depends on continuing investment by the capital-owners. Additional land 
could be acquired through invasion, or existing land utilized more efficiently by 
developing techniques.   
 
2. 2. Neo-classical Ideas  
Providing more coherent foundation to the ideas of classical thinkers, the 
economists in the second generation simplified the model consisting of a production 
function equation in which output was the product of labour and capital (Solow1956). 
Taking the actual growth of the economy to be exogenous to the model, output increased 
in proportionate to the increases of capital and/or labour. The neo-classical model 
excluded technological progress from analysis making it exogenous to the model. The 
focus was on what causes and affects the output at a certain time. 
Notwithstanding, the Solow’s model could not explain why only the technological 
progress contributes to long-run growth, and how it affects poor economy to transform 
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itself into an affluent society because the model kept technology outside of the equation. 
Solow’s model did not provide adequate foundation to explaining economic growth in 
developing countries.  
 
2. 3. Endogenous Technology Change and Growth  
In the 1980’s, economists found ways by which growth itself to be brought into 
the equation (Romer 1986, 1990). The researchers of this time introduced new theories of 
technological inventions and innovations that accounted for spillover effects. Since one 
discovery can cause benefits in other areas that are not always understood or even 
recognized, the entirety of benefits from technological discovery can never fully be 
understood. This theory helped economists to argue that technology causes increasing 
returns to scale. Endogenous growth models have attempted to explaining sources of 
cross-country convergence of per-capita incomes. 
A few important limitations can be identified in the whole range of models. First, 
most macroeconomic growth models have little relevance for societies not primarily 
concerned with business cycle or steady state properties. Second, most growth models are 
seen as advanced-country related relatively abstract theoretical constructs. Even if the 
vast majority of economies today are still poor, these models provide a little help in 
understanding growth issues in poor economies. However, some recent developments 





2. 4. Ideas Pertinent to Developing Economies 
2. 4. 1. Human Capital  
Skills accumulation has long been known to be an important indicator of growth 
(Becker 1961, Lucas 1988). Knowledge and skills do not possess a particular physical 
manifestation but are embodied in the minds and writings of individuals and societies. 
Human capital can be invested in. Since human capital has no physical shape or mass, it 
can only be measured indirectly. Various researchers have posited different methods and 
variables for trying to properly ascertain the essence of human capital (Barro 2001). Most 
researchers use some measure of education rates, educational attainment as the primary 
method for determining the level of human capital of a group or a nation. Particularly, 
years of schooling and highest level of education attained are considered some of the best 
variables for measuring levels of human capital. Even if the relationship between human 
capital and economic growth has been established (Bils and Klenow 2001), the extent to 
which human capital is likely to induce economic growth after controlling for the other 
known determinants of growth is seemingly unclear as yet. 
  
2. 4.  2. Role of Geographical Factors 
Geography may influence how a society develops. Some argue that the tropical 
climates have negative effect on the growth of humans that inhabit there (Bloom, Sachs, 
Collier, and Udry, 1998). If a country is landlocked, then it does not have access to the 
water trade routes, important to any economy. This lack of access is said to be quite 
harmful to a country and plays an important role in determining how a nation’s economy 
develops. A nation’s natural-resource exports as a percentage of GDP may affect growth. 
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It has been deduced that natural-resource rich countries have a tendency to have lower 
levels of growth than countries with poor levels of natural-resources (Sachs and Bloom 
1998).  
Notwithstanding, measures of tropics, germs, and crops explain cross-country 
differences in economic development through their impact on institutions but there is no 
direct relationship between growth and these geographical factors (Easterly and Levine 
2003). According to others while geography may relate to growth, its effects are 
inconsequential (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2004). The debate though is far from 
over. 
 
2. 4. 3. Economic Performance and Cultural Values  
The role of culture has long been studied not so much a cause but more of a 
general indicator of thriving and failed societies. Max Weber initially argued that the 
“Protestant Work Ethics” have contributed to prosperity, not by encouraging the seeking 
of wealth directly, but by advancing certain values that were conducive to the attainment 
of wealth (Landes 1998). Culture may influence all modes of institutional evolution and 
development. As such, culture may direct the development of the political and economic 
institutions in societies. Changes resulting from outside historically evolved culture 
through colonial implantations of European cultural values across the globe appeared to 
have impacted growth in such economies more differently. 
There has been an ongoing discussion on the role of ‘Asian Values’ in East Asian 
rapid industrialization (for instance, Hong-Jong 2003). Cultural values are said to have 
prompted East Asian leaders to act as to enhance the public goods. In East Asia 
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economies, market economy goes hand in hand with strong government participation. 
The economic aphorism that government intervention is at best a necessary evil is 
seemingly not applicable to East Asia economies. Government intervention takes on 
various forms in East Asia, positive nonintervention (Hong Kong), passive intervention 
(Taiwan), informed guidance (Japan), active leadership (South Korea and Malaysia), and 
direct management (Singapore). The performance of these East Asian economies 
seemingly depends on the performance and policies of their political institutions. 
Notwithstanding, Bella Balassa (1988) scoffed at cultural values as a product of 
retrospection and insisted on a return to economic policies. Paul Krugman (1994) 
suggested that Asia’s rapid economic growth is nothing less than increasing input without 
corresponding increase in productivity. However, if raising inputs is such an easy task, 
not miraculous as Krugman would like to pronounce, one might conjecture why most 
developing countries fail to do so. But, it is very difficult to comprehend as to how 
cultural values have played a direct role in East Asian industrialization.  
 
2. 4. 4. Role of Political Freedom in Economic Performance 
Thinkers in various disciplines have grappled with the problems inherent to 
political authority. Historically, many different political systems have been tried and 
almost as many have failed. However, liberal democracy has survived as the best 
available option or the best known evil. Democracy literally means “the rule of the 
people”, meaning majority rule. The degree to which the political freedom is practiced by 
different countries seemed to be varying from country to country. 
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Causal relationship between political freedom and economic growth is quite 
fragile. Some have shown a strong correlation (Diamond, 2003). It is, nonetheless, hard 
to explain how political freedom facilitates growth. At present each and every developed 
country is a liberal democracy, while almost every country that is developing is a 
fledgling democracy. But, political freedom emerged in the modern advanced economies 
as a result of or in response to the transformation of the entire economic system in most 
currently advanced economies. Political freedom itself may take diverse forms due to the 
cultural and historical contexts on which it is being practiced.  
 
2. 4. 5. Economic Freedom  
Economic freedom emerged in the context in which the economic institutions first 
developed. James Gwartney (2001) argues that individuals have economic freedom when 
the following conditions exist: “(a) their property acquired without the use of force, 
fraud, or theft is protected from physical invasions by others, and (b) they are free to use, 
exchange, or give their property to another as long as their actions do not violate the 
identical rights of others”. Though, economic freedom is commonly interpreted as 
pertaining to the individual, it also applies to society in general, that is the aggregate of 
each individual’s personal economic freedoms in a society. Economic freedom is seen to 
be vital for sustained economic growth. It appears to affect factor accumulation as well as 
technological progress. The most East Asian newly industrializing economies seemed to 




2. 4. 6. Domestic Policies 
Domestic economic policies seem to affect economic growth. The 
macroeconomic policy is vital for the development of an investment-friendly, export-
oriented and more open economy. Growth occurs when productive capital investment 
increases; the amount and quality of labour increases; and innovations/inventions. 
Policies affect growth directly through reducing costs or indirectly through affecting 
factor accumulation and technological progress. The policies that would restrict trade, 
increase taxes on capital and/or labour; and increase costly regulations on labour and 
business. Restrictions on economic activity retard economic growth. 
 
2. 4. 7. Government Institutions  
With Douglass North’s painstaking endeavors for defining the basis on which 
entire economic activities exist, government institutions and institutional change were 
merged into growth framework since the 1970’s. The general purpose of government 
institutions is to provide an environment in an objective context in which people can 
interact, following some set of rules that act as guidelines governing their actions. North 
(1990) defined economic institutions as, “. . . an arrangement between economic units 
that defines and specifies the ways by which these units can co-operate or compete”. 
Moreover, Rodrik (1999) asserts that: “institutions that provide dependable property 
rights, manage conflicts, maintain law and order, and align economic incentives with 
social costs and benefits are the foundation of long-term growth. This is the clearest 
message that comes across from the individual cases. . .” Government institutions are the 
rules and bodies of the growth game that define and govern all economic interactions. 
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The physical manifestation of government institutions in modern society is in 
such things as private property rights, contracts, and judicial enforcement of the like. 
Legal institutions can ensure rule of law for private economic activity to perform. 
Effective bureaucratic institutions are necessary to govern ensuring there are no radical 
changes in policy or interruptions in government services when governments change. 
Political stability needs to be maintained by managing conflicts emanating from racial, 
casts or religious differences. The non-corrupt government institutions tend to lower 
transaction and information costs for investors. It has been found that corruption 
negatively affect economic growth (Mauro 1995). 
 
2. 4. 8. External Openness  
Government external economic policies seemingly affect economic growth which 
has received heightened attention in the recent past. There may be various channels 
through which external openness can improve the prospects of growth of an economy. 
According to traditional theories of trade and investment under perfect competition, free 
international trade in goods and services could enhance allocation efficiency and welfare 
in the economy as a whole. The free trade allows resources to be transferred from 
inefficient import-substitution activities into areas in which the countries have 
comparative advantages (Krueger 1997).   
Recent advances in trade and growth theory provide better understanding of the 
correlation between trade policy and growth. These theories emphasize importance of 
imperfect competition, economies of scale, product diversity, and the spread of ideas and 
organizational techniques across international borders. With exporting, the size of the 
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market for firms is likely to expand. Higher demand thus may lead to economies of scale 
and economies of scope. In this backdrop, open trade policy has shown to be more 
effective in economic growth. Irrespective of whether or not firms can learn from 
exporting, exposure to greater foreign competition may also generate improvements in 
export’s performance by eliminating inefficiencies (Helpman and Krugman 1985, 
Krueger 1997). 
According to new growth theory, openness to trade and investment provides 
access to new technology, enhance efficiency and encourages innovations (Harrison 
1996). The efficiency of the firm is likely to increase raising economic growth either 
through learning from foreign rival firms or through spillovers of technology through 
inward foreign direct investors (Grossman and Helpman 1991). The firms producing for 
foreign markets could obtain expertise from their overseas buyers and trading partners. 
Business partnerships with leading foreign firms would enhance the market access 
worldwide.  
 
2. 5. Concluding Remarks 
The theoretical literature explaining the role of foreign investment inflows, 
external openness, government institutions, and their interactions in economic growth is 
largely limited and incomplete. Moreover, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. 
Therefore, further research is necessary to uncover the channels through which foreign 
investment, government institutions and external openness can affect growth. The present 





ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ON FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY  
3. 1. Introduction 
Developing countries have been seeking foreign investment inflows, whether 
public or private, for fostering economic development for the last few decades. The use 
of foreign investment by developing countries has varied substantially across countries 
and between historical periods. There has been variation both in terms of aggregate 
amount of investment supplied and in the form in which it has been provided. There are 
major differences in the institutional setting in which flows of investment took place. In 
pre-World War II period, there had been a wave of private flows such as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and portfolio flows from European countries to North America, 
Australia, and European Colonies in Latin America, Asia and Africa (Helleiner 1998). 
Foreign official development assistance (FDA) 1 programmes hardly ever existed and 
official multilateral lending agencies had yet to emerge. FDA, noticeably, started to 
emerge during the World War II period with newly independent nations taking the lion’s 
share. On the other hand, flows of private investment into developing countries started to 
increase dramatically in the 1990s. According to IMF, net private flows in the 1989-1995 
                                                 
1Foreign official development assistance, or foreign aid, consists of loans, grants, 
technical assistance and other forms of cooperation extended by foreign governments or 
multilateral organizations to developing countries. 
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period were on average about ten times that of the period 1983-1988, whereas net FDA 
had fallen by more than a half (Helleiner 1998). 
There are some stylized facts regarding the nexus between FDA and FDI. First, 
over the last four decades, most of the East Asian and Latin American countries have 
been able to attract a greater share of FDI, while countries in South Asia and Africa relied 
on FDA. Second, East Asian countries have achieved exceptionally high average income 
levels for the past few decades, whereas most Sub-Saharan African countries receiving 
much FDA have not been successful in economic progress (World Bank 2002). Finally, 
even though South Asian countries have received FDA for the last two decades, these 
regions have received considerable amount of FDI, especially FDI in export-oriented 
industries.2 On the other hand, Sub-Saharan African countries receiving much FDA have 
not attracted much FDI whereas East Asian newly industrializing economies receiving 
                                                 
2 Foreign direct investment is classified into three categories based on the motives for 
FDI viz., (a) market-seeking, (b) resource-seeking and (c) efficiency-seeking. In market-
seeking FDI firms engage in FDI in order to gain market access for various reasons such 
as: (1) buyer/supplier relationship (firms often follow existing suppliers or customers 
which move overseas); (2) adapting to local tastes and preferences by making market-
specific modifications to its products; (3) to reduce transactions costs (e.g. high transport 
costs of bulky low value good and high tariffs on imports); and (4) strategic reason where 
physical presence in market is required. In resource-seeking FDI, firms engage in FDI in 
order to gain access to resources abroad which are either unavailable or too expensive in 
the home country. These resources include (1) raw materials; (2) low-cost unskilled 
labour; (3) physical infrastructure (ports, roads, power, telecommunication); and (4) 
technological, innovatory and other created assets (e.g. brand names), including assets 
embodied in individual firms and clusters. Efficiency-seeking FDI comes under the 
following beneficial effects: (1) economies of scale & scope; (2) international 
specialization; and (3) improved efficiency through the rationalization of the global 
structure of MNE’s activities. However, it is very difficult to differentiate FDI in practice 
in line with these categories, and data are not readily available according to this 
classification. 
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very little FDA have attracted much FDI.3 This gives rise to an important question as to 
whether FDA deters or stimulates FDI inflows. These observations provide the 
motivation for studying the FDA-FDI nexus. Understanding the impact of FDA on FDI is 
important in view of the fact that FDI inflows are known to be growth stimulating while 
FDA are thought to be ineffective (Burnside and Dollar, 2000, Alesina and Dollar 2000, 
Svenson 2000a, 2000b).  
The literature on the relationship between FDA and private capital inflows is 
relatively new. Basically, the attention has been on the impact of multilateral lending, 
concessionary or non-concessionary, and grants on private capital inflows. Rodrik (1995) 
first attempted to explain the impact of multilateral lending on private capital inflows. 
According to Rodrik’s view, large multilateral FDA may indicate that government’s 
economic policy is approved by multilateral organizations and this positive signal will 
raise the country’s attractiveness to private inflows. Hence, multilateral FDA functions as 
a “signaling device” or “informational device”. However, Rodrik (1995) does not detect a 
significant impact of multilateral inflows on private capital inflows. In contrast, he finds a 
significant positive relationship between bilateral FDA and private capital inflows. 
Rodrik does not specifically analyze the impact of multilateral lending on FDI inflows. 
Some studies counter this claim, while others find evidence in support of this. 
Kharas and Shishido (1991) using a cross-sectional model for the data over 1974-85 find 
                                                 
3 For instance, during 1980-2000 period, FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP in 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia were 10.02%, 4.39%, and 4.27% respectively, 
whereas in Senegal, Madagascar, and Sri Lanka Ire 0.77%, 0.42%, and 0.97% 
respectively. On the other hand, FDA as a percentage of gross national income during the 
same period in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia were 0.08%, 0.03%, and 0.45% 
respectively, whereas in Senegal, Madagascar, and Sri Lanka Ire 13.19%, 10.89%, and 
6.88% respectively (World Bank 2002, OECD 2002).   
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that FDA was able to generate spillover effects that attracted private flows by alleviating 
credit rationing and improving creditworthiness. Loans and grants of multilateral lending 
agencies play a crucial role of coordinating the process of international private capital 
mobility (Checki and Stern 2000, Kharas and Shishido 1991, Alesina and Dollar 2000, 
Bird and Rowlands 1997) is another explanation.  These studies do not pay specific 
attention to the impact of FDA on FDI, but examine the nexus between FDA and private 
capital inflows in general.  
Some have examined the dynamic relationship between multilateral flows and 
private capital inflows. For instance, Ratha (2001) examines the trends in private flows 
and multilateral flows to developing countries, using data for 1970-1998. Ratha (2001) 
estimates a fixed-effect panel regression model in an attempt to uncover whether there is 
a negative relationship between multilateral FDA and private flows. He shows that even 
when some degree of negative relationship existed, that need not imply deterring of 
private flows. According to him, short-term negative impact and medium-term positive 
impact between multilateral flows and private flows to developing countries can co-exist. 
Multilateral FDA tends to be negatively impact on private flows in the concurrent period; 
but there appears to be a positive impact of past multilateral FDA on current private 
flows. Ratha also does not explicitly analyze the impact of multilateral FDA on FDI. 
Since the determinants of private capital in general may be different from the 
determinants of FDI, it is worthwhile investigating the relationship between multilateral 
FDA and FDI inflows. 
There are important limitations in the existing studies. First, apart from the major 
controversy on the role of FDA on diverse types of private inflows, the existing studies 
19 
do not explain the static and dynamic relationship between FDA and FDI specifically. 
Since FDI is the most important of all types of private inflows in promoting economic 
growth in developing countries, it is important to examine the nexus between FDA and 
FDI. 
Second, the main mechanism by which FDA is shown to stimulate private inflows 
is that FDA functions as a positive “signaling device”. However, aggregate FDA may not 
be functioning as a signaling devise. It may be the bilateral and multilateral inflows that 
are functioning as signaling device. It is likely that bilateral FDA creates positive signals 
for the investors while multilateral FDA generates negative signals on the private 
investors. This is because of the crucial differences of objectives and functions of 
bilateral and multilateral FDA inflows. 
The response of bilateral and multilateral FDA is likely to differ due to their differences 
specified above. The difference between bilateral and multilateral FDA inflows needs to 
be elaborated. Bilateral aid is likely to be channeled mostly because of commercial 
interests of the donors. Donor countries generally give aid because it is in their own 
interest to do so. Undoubtedly some aid is given with humanitarian motives in mind. 
However, most foreign aid is given for variety of political, strategic and economic 
reasons that benefit the donor countries in the longer term. It is therefore certainly 
possible that donor countries will give aid to countries which are targeted for future 
investment. Donor countries may be expecting to increase trade and investment ties with 
such economies. Moreover, prior economic ties, investment or trade, also induce granting 
aid to some countries. However, multilateral donor agencies may be providing aid to 
developing countries considering policy matters. Multilateral aid may be providing to 
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developing countries because of the macroeconomic problems that such economies are 
undergoing. This situation indicates these types of economies are not profitable and safe 
investment destinations. As a result, foreign investors will avoid investing in such 
economies. The private foreign investors are likely to respond to individual bilateral and 
multilateral flows since they give clear signals.  
Finally, there are also problems regarding the robustness of these results due to 
unanswered econometric problems, because: (a) these studies are either pooled cross-
sectional or dynamic models that use fixed effects technique so that possible reverse 
causality processes are not addressed; (b) they have not addressed endogeneity problem; 
and (c) they hardly have attempted to control for the other determinants of private capital 
inflows to see if there is any independent impact of FDA on private inflows. 
This chapter attempts to explain whether FDA inflows impact on FDI inflows in 
developing countries focusing on the incentive structure of the host economies. The 
present study aims at addressing these problems by using dynamic panel data techniques 
obtaining generalized method of moment (GMM) estimates. The empirical model will 
also include the other important determinants of FDI. While studying the relationship 
between FDA and FDI, the will mainly focus on the incentive structure necessary for 
attracting FDI inflows into developing countries.   
3. 2. The Empirical Methodology 
3. 2. 1. Empirical Models 
The basic model is: 
1it it it i t itY X Zα β µ λ ε−′ ′= + + + +        (3.1) 
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where 2~ (0, )i IID µµ σ , and 2~ (0, )it IID εε σ  2~ (0, )t IID λλ σ independent of each 
other. Y is FDI as a share of GDP; Z includes current or contemporaneous variables of 
multilateral inflows and bilateral inflows, and other determinants of FDI inflows; 1tX −  
includes lagged dependent variable, lagged variables of multilateral and bilateral official 
inflows; µ  is the unobserved country-specific effects; λ is time-specific effects; and ε  is 
the standard time-varying error term. The indexes i and t are country and time subscripts 
respectively. 
Before specifying the methods of estimating the model in (3.1), a cross-sectional 
regression needs to be estimated in order to identify FDA-FDI nexus. The cross-sectional 
analysis uses data averaged over 1978-2001, so that there is one observation per country. 
The following equation is estimated: 
 
i i i iY X Zα β ε= + +          (3.2) 
 
where Y is the inward FDI as a share of GDP, X is total FDA as a share of GDP, 
Z includes other determinants of FDI, and ε  is white-noise error term.  Since bilateral 
and multilateral inflows may have differential impact on FDI inflows, an alternative 
model is estimated replacing bilateral and multilateral inflows as a share of GDP for total 
official inflows. The models are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
Since OLS regression does not control for the possible simultaneity problem of 
FDA and FDI, the two-stage least squares regressions are estimated. The 2SLS regression 
uses all the explanatory variables as instruments as well as the tradition of the ‘legal 
systems’ of FDA-recipient countries is used as instruments. This allows us to control for 
22 
reverse causality from FDI to FDA. According to Reynolds and Flores (1996), ‘legal 
systems’4 practiced in developing countries originate from four European legal families: 
the English common law, and the French, German, and Scandinavian civil law. 
Following La Porta et al (1998), the legal systems of FDA-recipient countries are 
classified into: English common law (1), French civil law (2), German civil law (3), and 
Scandinavian civil law (4).5 The data for the instrumental variable is given in Appendix-
(3.2). The legal systems of the countries are, reasonably, assumed to play a vital role in 
determining official assistance to developing countries. Donor community is increasingly 
concerned about legal systems in recipient economies in determining the amount of 
official assistance since the effectiveness of FDA utilization depend on the nature of the 
legal system. Furthermore, legal system can be regarded as exogenous since most 
countries have acquired their legal systems through occupation or colonization before the 
19th century. 
As has been well-documented in the literature, there are some important 
shortcomings in pure cross-sectional OLS and 2SLS estimations which could be handled 
                                                 
4 The term ‘legal system’ refers to here to express agreed principles for settling disputes 
of any kind in a particular society. The legal system determines the nature of all the 
activities in a society. There are legal arrangements for determining how politicians are 
chosen, how they are kept in check, how policies are selected, how powers are allocated 
between levels of government, how judges and regulators are controlled, what services 
the government should provide, how government should tax, how it should regulate, 
which contracts it should enforce, how it should deal with externalities, and so and so 
forth. However, origination of legal systems of many countries took place either through 
colonial transplantation of various European legal traditions or through incorporation of 
European legal traditions voluntarily into individual societies. 
5 The legal system of a particular country belongs to one of the four legal families: 
English, French, German, and Scandinavian which are ranked from 1 to 4 respectively to 
be used as a variable.  For details of country classification and ranks, see Appendix 2.2. 
The number in the parenthesis here is the ranking of the legal system of individual 
countries. The sample includes 10 English common law countries, 21 French civil law 
countries, and 1German civil law country. 
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by dynamic panel data techniques (Chamberlain 1984, Holtz-Eakin et al 1988, Arellano 
and Bond 1991, Arellano and Bover 1995). First, cross-sectional regressions cannot 
capture the time-series dimension of the data, whereas dynamic panel techniques (DPD) 
could. DPD could assess whether FDA within a country have an effect on FDI in its 
various channels over-time. Moreover, pure cross-sectional regression treats the 
unobserved country-specific effects as part of the error term resulting in biased and 
inconsistent coefficients. Finally, pure cross-sectional regression does not control for 
possible endogeneity of explanatory variables. 
In order to address the first problem, a panel consisting of data for 32 countries 
over 1978-2001 is constructed. The data are averaged over non-overlapping 5-year 
periods. Five year averages rather than annual observations are used due to two reasons. 
First, 5-year averages can reduce the country specific fluctuations of the data addressing 
the problem of volatility of the data. Second, in large cross country empirical exercises 
missing observations is always a problem. Use of 5-year averages rather than annual 
observations cal also address the problem. According to the availability of data, a panel 
consisting of 32 developing countries over 1978-2001 is constructed. In the dynamic 
model in (3.3), time index is now specified as five-year averages rather than annual 
observations.  
 
1it it it i t itY X Zα β µ λ ε−′ ′= + + + +        (3.3) 
 
Since the model in (3.3) includes lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable, it is possible that 1itX −  could be correlated with composite error term, 
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( i t itµ λ ε+ + ). This is likely to render the biased and inconsistent estimates, even though 
the composite error terms are not serially correlated.  The literature proposes a number of 
techniques to overcome this problem. In order to address these issues, three different 
estimates will be obtained viz., generalized least squares estimator (GLS-Estimator), one-
step generalized method of moment estimator (1-Step GMM), and two-step generalized 
method of moment estimator (2-Step GMM).  
The GLS-estimator is a matrix of weighted average of within-estimator and 
between-estimator weighing each estimate by the inverse of its corresponding variance 
(Baltagi 1995).6 However, one important problem with this estimator is quasi-demeaned 
lagged dependent variable, , 1 ,. 1( )i t iy y− −− , is likely to be correlated with composite error 
term, ,. 1( )it iu u −− . This makes GSL-Estimator biased and inconsistent. Moreover, the 
GLS technique does not control for the possible endogeneity of explanatory variables, 
albeit it controls for the simultaneity.  
One-step and two-step GMM techniques could effectively control for the 
simultaneity and endogeneity of explanatory variables. In order to address the 
endogeneity problem, the literature proposes new IV estimates. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) propose to first-difference the regression equation to eliminate the country-
specific unobserved effects as follows: 
 
1 1 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )it it it it it it it itY Y X X Z Zα β ε ε− − − − −′ ′− = − + − + −     (3.4) 
 
                                                 
6 For a comprehensive elaboration, see Maddala (1971) and Baltagi (1995).  
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This procedure solves the problem of correlation between error term and 
explanatory variables but introduces a correlation between the new error term, 1it itε ε −− , 
and the lagged dependent variable, 1 2it itY Y− −− , included in 1 2it itX X− −− . To address 
endogeneity problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose using the lagged values of the 
explanatory variables in levels as instruments (IVs). These are valid instruments under 
the assumptions that: (a) there is no serial correlation in the error term, and (b) that 
explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. This differenced estimator uses the 
following moment conditions: 
 
( )1 0it it it jE Xε ε − − − =  , j ≥  2 . . . t-1, and t = 3 . . . T    (3.5) 
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose to obtain one-step and two-step generalized 
method of moment estimators using these moment conditions. In obtaining one-step 
estimator, the error terms are assumed to be both independent and homoskedastic, across 
countries and overtime. This is referred to as one-step GMM estimator (1-Step GMM). In 
the second-step, the residuals obtained in the first step are used to construct consistent 
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix, thus relaxing the assumption of independence 
and homoskedasticity.  This estimator is referred to as two-step GMM estimator (2-Step 
GMM). 
The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on two important conditions 
that: (a) instruments are valid; and (b) error term does not exhibit serial correlation. To 
test for the validity of instruments, the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions is 
used. The test has a 2ℵ distribution with (Q-K) degrees of freedom, where Q is the 
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number of IVs and K is the number of explanatory variables. Second, in order to examine 
the assumption of no-serial correlation in error terms, whether or not the differenced error 
term exhibits second-order serial correlation is tested. 
3. 2. 2. Description of Variables and Data 
The net FDI 7 as a share of GDP is used as the dependent variable. FDI is defined 
as an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and 
control of a resident entity in one economy, foreign direct investor or parent enterprise, in 
an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor, FDI 
enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate (World Bank 2002). FDI may be 
undertaken by individuals as well as business entities. There are three components in 
FDI: equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. Equity capital is the 
foreign direct investor’s purchase of shares of an enterprise in a country other than its 
own. Reinvested earnings comprise the direct investor’s share, in proportion to direct 
equity participation, of earnings not distributed as dividends by affiliates or earnings not 
remitted to the direct investor. Such retained profits by affiliates are reinvested. Intra-
company loans or intra-company debt transactions refer to short- or long-term borrowing 
and lending of funds between direct investors -parent enterprises- and affiliate 
enterprises. FDI stock is the value of the share of their capital and reserves -including 
retained profits- attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of 
affiliates to the parent enterprise. Such investment involves both the initial transaction 
between the two entities and all subsequent transactions between them and among foreign 
                                                 
7 Net FDI means that sum of (net) equity capital, re-investment of earnings, and other 
long-term capital as shown in balance of payments. The World Bank (2002) records net 
FDI inflows. All the values are expressed in 1980 US dollars.  
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affiliates. Data is collected from the World Bank (2002), for the period from 1978 to 
2001. To control for the size of the economy, FDI as a share of GDP is used. 
There are two main sources of FDA. Multilateral FDA refers to grants, loans and 
credits from such sources as International Monetary Fund, World Bank, regional 
development banks, and other intergovernmental agencies. Bilateral FDA contains grants, 
loans and credits from donor governments to recipient governments. The data are 
collected from OECD (2002).8  
There are some FDI seeking to capture the markets in host economies. In such 
cases, higher the size of the market in the host economy higher will be the inflow of FDI. 
Per-capita income is used as a proxy for the domestic market size in the host economies. 
The data are from the World Bank (2002). 
Good physical infrastructure provides better access for inward FDI. Availability 
of better physical infrastructure facilities seemingly improves the investment climate for 
FDI. The favourable role of physical infrastructure in influencing the patterns of FDI 
inflows has been substantiated by recent studies (Loree and Guisinger 1995, Mody and 
Srinivasan 1996). Foreign investors may consider the infrastructure available to be 
important when deciding to relocate export-platform production undertaken for efficiency 
considerations. In other words, physical infrastructure could be an important 
consideration for investors in their choices of locations for FDI in general and for 
efficiency-seeking production in particular. However, there are no adequate country level 
data on the quantity of infrastructure. Therefore, the government investment on 
                                                 
8 The data are collected from the reports of various years of OECD’s “Geographical 
Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid recipient Countries”. 
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infrastructure can be used as a proxy. International Monetary Fund (2001)9 annually 
records data for government spending, among others, on: (a) transportation and 
communication, (b) economic affairs and services, (c) housing and community amenities, 
and (d) general public services. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive. 
Since investors are concerned about the cost of labour when they decide to shift 
production from one place to another, relative wage cost is a relevant factor. The variable 
is constructed in the following manner: average real wage in a country divided by 
weighted average of average real wage in OECD countries.10  
External openness is likely to be an important determinant of FDI inflows. A 
distortion free environment has specific implications for investment policies. Openness 
represents the degree to which an economy permits markets to allocate scarce resources 
where they are valued the most and for governments to realize the law of comparative 
advantages. In a seminal work, Bhagwati (1978) proposed that “with due adjustments for 
differences among countries for their economic size, political attitudes towards FDI and 
political stability, both the magnitude of FDI inflows and their efficacy in promoting 
economic growth will be greater over the long haul in countries pursuing the export 
promotion (EP) strategy than in countries pursuing the import substitution (IS) strategy”. 
The openness can also partly explain the foreign demand for exported goods of a 
particular country. The study considers openness to be an important ingredient in the 
                                                 
9 Various Yearbooks are used. Each spending variable is reported as percentage of real 
GDP.   
10 The included OECD countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxemberg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
and United States of America.  
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incentive structure of a host economy. The simple trade share is the most widely used 
index to measure trade openness due to the unavailability of other measures in a large 
number of developing countries. Trade share index is computed as export plus imports 
divided by GDP which, however, is typically effective only as a proxy for openness in 
most ways, particularly, as a raw measure of the exposure of productive resources of the 
economy to international markets.11 The data is from World Bank (2002). 
Level of human capital is a likely determinant of inward-FDI. Infant mortality 
rate and adults’ literacy rate are used to denote education and health care as possible 
proxies for the quality of human capital in the host economies. The data are from World 
Bank (2002). 
Strengths of government institutions consist of a crucial indicator of the incentive 
structure. The indexes of government institutions used in the literature of international 
investment climates are taken into account to construct composite index of the 
government institutions. The composite index is created by six distinct indexes provided 
by Political Risk Services12 : rule of law index (ROL), the index of corruption (CUP) in 
government, index of bureaucratic quality (BUQ), ethnic tensions index (EHT), index of 
risk of repudiation of government contracts, and the index of risk of expropriation (EPR). 
The indexes of corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, and ethnic tensions all range 
in value from 0-6 with higher values indicating better ratings.  The scores of the latter 
two indexes range from 0-10, with higher values indicating better ratings, i.e. less risk. A 
6-point composite index of government institutions is created using these indexes. 
                                                 
11 Traditionally the tariff discrimination hypothesis views that FDI is undertaken in the 
country to which it is difficult to export because of the tariff impediment (Scaperlanda 
and Mauer, 1969) which means that openness and FDI inflows are negatively related. 
12 Data source: www.countrydata.com. 
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According to the availability of data, a sample includes 32 developing countries 
from South Asia, East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America is used. A more 
details of the data and variables are given in the Appendix 3.3. 
3. 3. Results and Discussion 
3. 3. 1. Results of Cross-Sectional Regressions 
The scatter and the nearest neighbor fits between aggregate FDA and FDI were 
plotted for several economies. The Figures are given in the Appendix-3.1. It is difficult to 
determine if there is a possible relationship between aggregate FDA and FDI inflows 
based on this information. 
Before estimating the dynamic panel data models, the equation in (3.2) is 
estimated both by OLS and by 2SLS in which FDI is regressed on total FDA and other 
determinants of FDI (Table 3.1). The coefficient of aggregate FDA is negative but not 
statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. There appears to be no significant 
relationship between aggregate FDA and FDI inflows. 
The estimates on other determinants are as following (Table 3.1). First, the 
coefficients of per-capita income in both the models are positive and significant. Second, 
the coefficient of the relative labour cost in both the models show a negative sign as 
expected even though they are not significant at conventional significance levels. Third, 
results from both models show that the coefficient of the trade share index is positive and 
significant. This result is consistent with the Bhagwati’s (1978) hypothesis that export-
oriented economies attract more FDI than import-substitution economies. Fourth, the 
coefficient of government investment in infrastructure variable is positive and significant. 
Fifth, government institutions positively impact on FDI inflows. Finally, while literacy 
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rate is positive and significant in both the models, the coefficient of infant mortality rate 
in both the models is negative but not significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 3.1: Modeling Foreign Direct Investment by OLS and 2SLS 








































 2R : 0.759134  
F: 9.06 [0.000]**  
DW= 1.63 
Observations = 32 
Log:  109.9821  
LR test: 2.7612 [0.0966]* 
Observations = 32 
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and * indicate the coefficients are 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
However, there may be important differences of objectives of multilateral flows 
and bilateral flows significantly affecting FDA-FDI nexus.13 Some donors are likely to 
                                                 
13 Diverse objectives of USA official assistance described in General Accounting Office 
(1993) are applicable to bilateral assistance from any country. These objectives more or 
less apply to multilateral assistance (General Accounting Office1993). The bilateral 
official assistance as a percentage of total official assistance for all developing countries 
in 1998, 1999, and 2000 were 55.14 percent, 65.62 percent, and 60.18 percent 
respectively. The multilateral official assistance as a percentage of total official assistance 
in 1998, 1999, and 2000 were 44.81 percent, 34.37 percent, and 39.81 percent 
respectively (OECD 2002). 
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focus more on overall policy frameworks and economic stability in recipient economies, 
which in turn compel them to focus more on overall deficits in government budget and 
balance of payments. Furthermore, donor countries are likely to promote bilateral 
assistance as a mode of improving trade relations as well as establishing links for future 
investments in developing countries. Therefore, bilateral donors may pledge and disburse 
loans, credits and grants to developing countries aiming at increasing future overseas 
investment. This may be the case when donor countries pursue a policy of promoting 
overseas investment to maintain long-term economic sustainability. 
 
Table 3.2: Modeling FDI by OLS and 2SLS 










































 2R : 0.761853  
F: 9.197 [0.000]**  
Log: 113.721  
DW= 1.78 
Observations= 32 
Log: 109.7708  
LR test: 4.2525 [0.0392]* 
Observations= 32 
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and * indicate the coefficients are 
significant at the 10 percent levels. 
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In order to examine whether there is a differential response from bilateral and 
multilateral flows to FDI inflows the specified model in (3.1) is re-estimated by including 
both bilateral and multilateral flows in the regressions (Table 3.2). While the coefficient 
of multilateral FDA is negative and significant, the coefficient of bilateral FDA is 
positive and significant. One important question is why bilateral and multilateral inflows 
separately have a significant relationship with FDI inflows while the coefficient of 
aggregate official inflows is statistically insignificant. This is likely to be because 
multilateral and bilateral inflows have statistically significant opposite signs. While 
multilateral inflows are negatively related, bilateral inflows are positively related to FDI 
inflows. The data aggregation seems to create this problem. 
3. 3. 2. Results of GLS and GMM Estimation 
The relationship between aggregate FDA and FDI were assessed empirically 
using the dynamic models: GLS-estimator, 1-Step GMM, and 2-Step GMM are obtained 
(Tables 3.3). The results of the Sargan test show that the instruments are valid, and the 
error terms do not contain second order serial correlation. 
The coefficient of lagged FDI is positive and significant even in the presence of 
other variables. This may be due to the fact that past performance of FDI functions as an 
informational device for further FDI inflows. Results of all three models show that the 
coefficient of aggregate FDA is contemporaneously positive but not significant at 
conventional significance levels. The coefficient of lagged FDA variable is positive but 
not significant at 10 percent level in GLS and 2-Step GMM, but significant in 1-Step 
GMM. One reason why the coefficient of lagged variable is significant may be because 
of the presence of heteroskedasticity in 1-Step GMM which is eliminated in the 2-Step 
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GMM. In general there is no evidence for a relationship between aggregate FDA and FDI 
inflows. 
 
Table 3.3: Modeling FDI by GLS and GMM 
Variable GLS-Estimator 1-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 























































 2R : 0.597937 
W: 346.6 [0.000] ** 
AR(1):1.226 [0.220]   
AR(2):   2.59 
[0.009] * 
Observations= 160 

















Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and * indicate that the coefficients are 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Per-capita income, trade share, government investment in infrastructure, and 
government institutions positively impact on FDI inflows (Table 3.3). This supports the 
claim that the incentive structure of the host economies of FDI is crucial for attracting 
FDI inflows.  
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Table 3.4: Modeling FDI by GLS and GMM 
Variable GLS-Estimator 1-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 
FDI (-1) 0.88030  




































































 2R : 0.6808 
W:  489.9 [0.00] ** 
AR(1): 0.69 [0.490] 
AR(2): -3.1 [0.00] * 
Observations = 160 
W:  220.5 [0.00] ** 
Sargan: 32.3 [0.0]** 
AR(1):  -2.46[0.0] * 
AR(2): -1.17[0.240] 
Observations = 160 
W: 218.7 [0.0] ** 
Sargan:  12.7[0.0] * 
AR(1): -1.79[0.073] 
AR(2):  -1.18[0.23] 
Observations = 160 
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and * indicate that the coefficients are 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
The model with multilateral FDA and bilateral FDA were also estimated to obtain 
GLS-estimates, 1-Step GMM, and 2-Step GMM (Table 3.4). While both the 
contemporaneous and lagged coefficients of multilateral inflows are negative and 
significant, the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients of bilateral inflows are positive 
and significant. The long-run coefficient of multilateral FDA is negative in all GLS, 1-
Step GMM and 2-Step GMM, while the long-run coefficient of bilateral FDA is positive 
in all three models.  The coefficients of other determinants included in the models have 
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expected signs. The findings of this study appear to be consistent with Rodrik’s (1995) 
finding that multilateral lending deter rather than stimulate private capital inflows. 
3. 4. Concluding Remarks 
The findings of this empirical exercise can be summarized as follows.  First, 
empirical results suggest that there is no significant relationship between aggregate FDA 
and FDI inflows. In the introductory part, it was argued conceptually that aggregate FDA 
in general can perform as an informational devise. As a result dependence on FDA is 
likely to encourage or discourage FDI inflows. However, it appears that the aggregate 
FDA does not play such an informational role as we hypothesized. Foreign investors may 
not be responding to aggregate FDA inflows since they could not specify the motives of 
those flows. The existing literature do not specifically pay attention to explaining of any 
role of aggregate FDA. It appears that there is no rational basis for aggregating bilateral 
and multilateral FDA inflows since these two are completely distinct objects. The 
insignificant statistical relationship may be arising from this.  
Second, multilateral FDA appears to be negatively impacting on FDI inflows. 
Third, bilateral inflows positively impact on FDI inflows. Since bilateral flows are likely 
to be motivated by commercial interests, it is likely that bilateral aid is given with the 
purpose of committing future investment to such aid recipient countries. On the other 
hand, when countries attract much multilateral flows it may be an indication that such 
countries are unable to attract private capital due to macroeconomic problems or because 
economic environment is not favorable for private investment. This may send negative 
signals to foreign investors. In order to understand why bilateral and multilateral inflows 
send different signals, we further need to think about the differences between these two 
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flows. Bilateral FDA inflows may be driven by commercial interests of developed 
countries which seek to increase future private investment to some developing countries. 
As a way of strengthening bilateral relations and goodwill with the prospective 
investment hosting economies, advanced countries are likely to give bilateral aid to 
developing countries. Multilateral aid is provided by multilateral development agencies 
which are more concerned about stability in the international economy as well as in the 
developing countries. However, multilateral agencies have to assist developing countries 
when they face macroeconomic and other economic difficulties. Therefore when 
countries receive much multilateral aid it is likely that private foreign investors decide 
that these economies are not safe investment destinations. This means that multilateral 
aid sends negative signals to potential foreign investors. Therefore, when countries rely 
heavily on multilateral aid inflows, investors may avoid investing in such countries. 
Finally, government investment in infrastructure, trade share, government 
institutions, and per-capita income positively impact on FDI inflows. These results are 
consistent with Rodrik (1995) and Ratha (2001). These findings indicate that though 
multilateral/bilateral aid inflows are important in explaining FDI inflows, the overall 
incentive structure of the economy that hosts FDI is also playing a crucial role in 
attracting FDI. One important issue is whether bilateral and multilateral FDA responds to 
the needs of the developing countries creating the endogeneity problem. However, the 
generalized method of moment techniques that are employed in the empirical exercise 





EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, EXTERNAL 
OPENNESS, AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ON 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: A THEORETICAL FORMULATION AND 
A CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
4. 1. Introduction 
The role of government institutions has often been a subject of importance in 
economic growth literature. North and Thomas (1973) developed the notion that ‘social 
infrastructure’ or ‘social technology’ (Nelson and Sampat, 2001) reduces uncertainty, 
transaction and information costs to allow agents to capture the full social returns to their 
actions. The government interacts with private economic agents through government 
institutions. Strengths of government institutions are manifested by such things as (a) 
property rights; (b) rule of law; (c) ethnic and social harmony; and (d) the bureaucracy. 
Some recent studies have addressed specific issues related to the impact of institutions on 
economic growth. The government institutions seemingly consist of a major source of 
economic growth (Acemoglu et al, 2004; Hall and Jones, 1999). The empirical literature 
on innovations underscores the strong correlation between intellectual property rights and 
innovations (Kahn and Sokoloff 2001). The role of government institutions relating to 
crime/expropriation and rent-seeking are also explained (Grossman and Kim, 1996). 
Government institutions tend to foster economic growth when they generate externalities 
and raise productivity through a number of channels such as: (a) increasing mobility of 
capital, (b) lowering information costs, (c) helping risk-spreading, (d) helping 
39 
enforcement of contracts by developing clearly defined private property rights and 
dispute settlement mechanisms, and (e) lowering rent-seeking activities. The focus of the 
theoretical formulation in this chapter is not on the size of the government but on the 
strengths of government institutions. 
 External openness is also supposed to be an important determinant of economic 
growth. Several different literatures address the functions of more open trade policies in 
economic growth. According to some models, export expansion would generate positive 
externalities and increase productivity by offering greater economies of scale (Feder 
1982; Ram 1987). Moreover, exports are likely to alleviate foreign exchange constraints 
and can thereby provide greater access to international markets (Esfahani 1991). Exports 
generate externalities for the domestic goods sector by transferring labour skills (Esfahani 
1991). Import-side of the economy generates externalities through the import of capital 
goods and intermediate goods. In a world with embodied technology, trade in capital 
goods and intermediate goods provides a means for the international diffusion of 
technology (Caselli and Wilson 2002, Thangavelu and Gulasekaran 2004). Since most of 
the developing countries acquire embodied technologies by importing capital and 
intermediate goods from a relatively small number of technologically advanced 
economies, capital and intermediate imports seemingly provide a measure of technology 
adoption by developing countries. Capital flows also tend to be a source of international 
diffusion of technology. FDI acts as a vehicle for developing economies to learn from 
abroad since it has the ability to shape opportunities for learning and innovation in local 
economies around the world. Changes in production and competition underlie both the 
process of globalization and the importance of creating local economies that are 
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‘learning’ economies (Lundvall, 1995). These include the growing knowledge intensity 
of production, the emergence of an innovation-based mode of competition and the 
pressures to liberalize, to deregulate and to accept international disciplines based on these 
principals. These changes have put a premium on the ability of both firms and 
governments to learn and to innovate (Mytelka 1998). 
Strong government institutions and liberalized external economic policies appear 
to be complementary determinants of economic growth (Rodrik 2000). Weak government 
institutions and lack of trade openness create a number of disincentives in the economy. 
Level of investment critically depends on both property rights as well as the business 
environment of a country. Investment environment is characterized by the rule of law, in 
particular the stability of rules and regulations governing business transactions, as well as 
political stability and transparency.  Weak government institutions tend to increase the 
uncertainty of doing business. Transaction and information cost would be higher when 
government institutions are weak and the barriers to trade and investment are high. This 
results in reducing investment in human capital (Kang and Sawada 2001). Moreover, it 
tends to reduce the learning intensity of individuals. Lack of trade openness (Krueger 
1974) and weak government institutions (Eicher and Penalosa 2003) tend to increase 
rent-seeking activities reducing incentives for investing in R&D because innovators may 
not get full benefits to their efforts due to existence of rent-seeking.  
This chapter develops a 3-sector model of growth to examine the role of 
government institutions and external openness by extending the model of Feder (1982) in 
the context of neo-classical growth theory. The resulting growth equations are, then, 
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empirically estimated by using dynamic panel models for a sample consisting of 32 
developing countries for 1978-2000.  
 
4. 2. The Model 
4. 2. 1. Version I:- Government Institutions Production Spillovers: A 
Two-Sector Model 
The models presented in this chapter are modifications of the model presented by 
Feder (1982). Feder (1982) explains the effects of export growth on economic growth 
using a two sector model including a domestic sector and an export sector. But in this 
thesis, we introduce a government institutions building sector to make it a three sector 
model. The purpose is to explain the role of openness and government institutions and 
their interactions on growth. In the first model, we have domestic sector and government 
institutions building sector while in the second model we have domestic sector, export 
sector and government institutions building sector. We also introduce dynamic spillovers 
following the specification used by Wang (2000) who adopts the approach followed 
Lucas (1973). 
The first model developed here attempts to capture dynamic spillover effects of 
government institutions on private production. Suppose in the first case, the total output 
of the economy ( )Y is produced in two sectors: (1) production by the private sector ( )N , 
and building of government institutions ( )G . The production of the private sector 
includes externalities of government institutions ( )*G and foreign direct investment ( )D . 
K is the domestic capital stock. FDI is used here as a flow variable. Therefore, FDI is not 
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correlated with the domestic capital stock in the concurrent period. FDI may be affecting 
domestic capital formation with a time lag. D does not hire labour. D is used as a source 
of capital in the domestic and export sectors. For the analytical purpose this formulation 
stipulates that formation of foreign capital in this economy is not taken into 
consideration. The basic model set up is; 
 
t t tY N G= +           (4.1) 
*( , ; , )t Nt Nt t tN F L K G D= ,  0, 0; 0, 0L L K KF F F F′ ′′ ′ ′′> < > <    (4.2) 
( , )t Gt GtG H L K=    0, 0; 0, 0L L K KH H H H′ ′′ ′ ′′> < > <   (4.3) 
N GL L L= +           (4.4) 
N GK K K= +           (4.5) 
* * *
1 1 1t t t tG G G Gλ− − − − = −    0 1λ< ≤      (4.6) 
 
where ,F H are constant returns-to-scale production functions. , ,N GL L L  are total labour, 
domestic sector labour, and government institutions building labour, whereas , ,N GK K K  
are total capital, domestic sector capital, and government institutions building capital. In 
this formulation, government sector ( )*G as well as FDI ( )D has an externality effect on 
the private production sector. 
Equation (4.6) specifies the dynamic process by which building of government 
institutions create externalities in the private production sector. Wang (2000) first 
employed this approach in a two sector model in an attempt to explain inter-sectoral 
externalities of financial development and real output in a specific context in which 
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supply-leading and demand-following financial development. Unlike Wang (2000), this 
chapter considers the dynamic adjustment process for government institutions. Agents in 
the private production sectors are assumed to form an expectation about government 
institutions. The greater the anticipation of better services from government institutions 
the higher will be the production in the private sectors because of the improved efficiency 
and lowered costs. This formulation is quite similar to the Lucas’s (1973) aggregate 
supply story in which Lucas specifies expectation errors about prices as a source of 
variations in output.  
In addition to externalities captured in F , there are likely to be factor productivity 
differences between government institutions building and private sector production. 
However, it is not possible to estimate sectoral marginal factor productivities due to the 






θ= = +      θ−∞ < < ∞    (4.7) 
 
where upper-case letters denote partial derivatives in each input. The factorθ  captures 
the productivity differences allowing the ratios to deviate from unity. Note that if factors 
are perfectly mobile across sectors, there are no factor productivity differences so thatθ  
becomes zero. In this formulation, either sector records higher productivity depending on 
the sign ofθ . The productivity difference can take negative or positive value depending 
on which sector is more productive.  
 
The equations (4.7) imply that; 
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( )1K KH Fθ= +  and ( )1L LH Fθ= +      (4.8) 
     
The model can now be solved to obtain determinants of economic growth. The 
change of aggregate output, private-sector output, and government institutions overtime 
can be obtained by differentiating from (4.1) to (4.3) with respect to time; 
 
Y N G= + && &           (4.9) 
*
L N K N G DN F L F K F G F D= + + +&& & & &        (4.10) 
L G K GG H L H K= +& & &          (4.11) 
 
Substitute (3.8) into (3.11) and rearrange; 
     
( ) ( )1 1L G K GG F L F Kθ θ= + + +& & &      
( )1 L G K GG F L F Kθ  = + + & & &         (4.12) 
 
Taking into consideration of (4.4) and (4.5), the equation (4.12) can be written as; 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 L N K NG F L L F K Kθ  = + − + − & & & & &  
 
( )1L N K N L K
GF L F K F L F K θ+ = + − +
&& & & &        (4.13)  
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Substitute (4.10) into (4.13) and rearrange to get; 
 
( )1L X K X L K
GF L F K F L F K θ+ = + − +
&& & & &  
( ) *1L K G D
GN F L F K F G F Dθ= + − + ++
& && & & &       (4.14) 
 
Adding G&  to the both sides of (4.14);  
 
( ) *1L K G D
GN G F L F K G F G F Dθ+ = + + − + ++
&& & && & & &  
 
*
1L K D G
N G F L F K F D G F Gθθ
 + = + + + + + 
& & && & & &      (4.15) 
 
From (4.9) substituteY& for N G+ && into (4.15); 
 
*
1L K D G
Y F L F K F D G F Gθθ
 = + + + + + 
& && & & &       (4.16) 
 
Assume, further, an explicit functional form for the private production function 
such that *G and D affect private goods production (N) with constant elasticities of gµ and 
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dµ  (Feder 1982). The production function of the private goods sector, therefore, becomes 
* . ( , )g d N NN G D L K
µ µ= Φ so that;  
 
( )* 1* . ,g dg N N g GN NG D L K FG G
µ µµ µ−∂  = Φ = = ∂        (4.17) 
( )* 1. ,g dd N N d DN NG D L K FD D
µ µµ µ−∂  = Φ = = ∂        (4.18) 
 
Substitute (4.17) and (4.18) into (4.16) to get; 
 
*
1L K d g
N NY F L F K D G G
D G
θµ µθ
     = + + + +     +     
& && & & &     (4.19) 
 
Dividing both sides of (4.19) by total output ( )Y  and rearranging, one can obtain the 
sources of economic growth as follows;  
 
*
1L K d g
Y L L K K N D G N GF F
Y Y L Y K D Y Y G Y
θµ µθ
            = + + + +            +            
& && & & &
  (4.20) 
 
It is now possible to introduce the process of adaptive expectations of private 
agents about government institutions. Dynamic adjustment process of equation (4.6) is 
usually written as; 
 
( )* *1 11t t tG G Gλ λ− −= + −         (4.21) 
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1 st t s
s
G Gλ λ∞ −
=
= −∑          (4.22) 
The expected level of tG  is a weighted average of all present and previous values 
of tG , since weights sum to unity ( )1 1sλ λ ∑ − =  . Substitute from (4.21) into (4.20) 
and knowing the specification associated with the adaptive process is identical to the 










YY L L K K N DF F
Y Y Y L Y K D Y
N G
G Y




      = − + + +            
  + +   +   
&& & & &
&
   (4.23) 
 
The equation (4.23) gives the determinants of economic growth. The first term is 
the lag of the growth rate. The second and third terms respectively show the effects of 
growth of population and the growth of physical capital on economic growth. The fourth 
term captures the marginal externality effects d
N
D
µ λ        of FDI on economic growth. 
The last term denotes the effects of marginal factor productivity differences
1
θ λθ




µ λ        of government institutions ( )G . The contribution of 
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government institutions and FDI to economic growth depends on whether or not they 
create positive externalities.  
Equation (4.23) can be parameterized in various ways depending on which 
coefficients one expects to estimate. Since the purpose of the present study is to examine 
the role of openness and government institutions as determinants of growth, for the 
estimation purposes, equation (4.23) is parameterized taking: growth of population, 
growth of capital stock, FDI as a share of GDP, and government institution as 

















θ µ λ τθ
    + =    +             (4.27) 
( )1 λ α− =           (4.28)  
 






YY L K D G
Y Y L K Y Y
α β γ σ τ−
−
= + + + +& && & & &        (4.29) 
 
49 
For convenience denote t
Y y
Y




















=& , so that 
equation (4.29) can be written as;  
 
1t t t t t ty y l k d gα β γ σ τ−= + + + +        (4.30) 
 
where, y , l ,and d respectively are growth of output, population growth, FDI as a share of 
GDP, and g approximately represents the quality of government institutions. 
 
4. 2. 2. Version II:- Private Export Production Spillovers: A Three-
Sector Model 
The dynamic spillovers of exports-expansion together with externalities of 
government institutions building can be addressed by extending the above model to 
incorporate a private export goods sector. Suppose now that the total output of the 
economy ( )Y is produced in three sectors: (1) production by the private sector for 
domestic market ( )N , (2) production by the private sector for exports ( )X , and (3) 
government institutions building ( )G . 
In this formulation, production in each ( )G  and ( )*X  sectors as well as 
FDI ( )D has an externality effect on the production of domestic goods sector. Since there 
appears to be feedback effects between external openness and government institutions 
(Acemoglu et al 2004, Anderson and Marcouiller 1999, Wei 2000), an interaction term of 
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exports and government institutions ( )Z  is included into the production function in the 
private domestic goods sector. The model also includes externalities of government 
institutions ( )G and FDI ( )D in the production of export goods.  
Unlike the previous case, this model attempts to capture the adaptive expectations 
of private agents about the externalities of exports expansion. The equation (4.37) 
specifies the dynamic adjustment process by which exports create externalities in the 
economy. 
There is no shortage of imported intermediate goods in which the trade openness 
is important for freely importing intermediate goods. The model structure described 
above can be presented by the following set of equations; 
 
t t t tY X G N= + +          (4.31) 
( , ; , )t Xt Xt t tX Q L K G D= ,  0, 0; 0, 0L L K KQ Q Q Q′ ′′ ′ ′′> < > <   (4.32) 
( , )t Gt GtG H L K=    0, 0; 0, 0L L K KH H H H′ ′′ ′ ′′> < > <   (4.33) 
*( , ; , , , )t Nt Nt t t t tN F L K X G D Z= , 0, 0; 0, 0L L K KF F F F′ ′′ ′ ′′> < > <    (4.34) 
N X GL L L L= + +          (4.35) 
N X GK K K K= + +          (4.36) 
* * *
1 1 1t t t tX X X Xψ− − − − = −    0 1ψ< ≤      (4.37) 
 
where , ,F H Q are constant returns-to-scale production functions. , , ,N X GL L L L  are total 
labour, domestic goods sector labour, export goods sector labour, and government 
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institutions building labour, whereas , , ,N X GK K K K  are total capital, domestic sector 
capital, exports sector capital, and government institutions building capital. 
In addition to externalities captured in F  andQ , there is likely to be factor 
productivity differences. Outward-oriented policies or greater openness are argued to be 
contributing to growth as marginal factor productivities are higher in export sector than in 
the domestic goods sector (Feder 1982). Similar to the previous case, it is assumed that; 
 




θ= = +      xθ−∞ < < ∞    (4.38) 




θ= = +      gθ−∞ < < ∞    (4.39) 
 
The factor iθ  captures the productivity differences and its properties are the same as 
explained in the previous case. The equations (4.38) and (4.39) imply; 
 
( )1K x KQ Fθ= +  and ( )1L x LQ Fθ= +      (4.40) 
( )1K g KH Fθ= +  and ( )1L g LH Fθ= +      (4.41) 
     
The change of aggregate output, domestic-sector output, export sector output, and 
government institutions overtime can be obtained by differentiating from (4.31) to (4.34) 
with respect to time; 
 
Y X G N= + +&& & &          (4.42) 
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L X K X G DX Q L Q K Q G Q D= + + +&& & & &        (4.43) 
L G K GG H L H K= +& & &          (4.44) 
*
L N K N G X D ZN F L F K F G F X F D F Z= + + + + +&& & & & & &      (4.45) 
 
Substitute (4.40) into (4.43) and rearrange to get; 
 
( )1 x L X K X G DX F L F K Q G Q Dθ  = + + + + && & & &       (4.46)  
 
Substitute (4.41) into (4.44) and rearrange; 
     
( )1 g L G K GG F L F Kθ  = + + & & &  
( )1L G K G g
GF L F K θ+ = +
&& &         (4.47) 
 
Taking into consideration of (4.35) and (4.36), the equation (4.46) can be written as; 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 x L N G K N G G DX F L L L F K K K Q G Q Dθ  = + − − + − − + + && & & & & & & &  
( ) ( ) ( )1 L K L N K N L G K G G Dx
X F L F K F L F K F L F K Q G Q Dθ = + − + − + + ++
& && & & & & & &   (4.48)  
 
Substitute (4.45) and (4.47) into (4.48) and rearrange to get; 
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( ) ( ) ( )* 11G X D Z L K G D xg
G XN F G F X F D F Z F L F K Q G Q D θθ− + + + = + + + − − ++
& && && & & & & & &    
( ) ( ) ( )*11L K G D G X D Zxg
G XN F L F K Q G Q D F G F X F D F Zθθ= + + + − − + + + +++
& && && & & & & & &  (4.49) 
 
Adding X G+ &&  to the both sides of (4.49);  
 




11L K D G Xxg
G X D Z
G XN G X F L F K Q D G Q G X F X
F G F X F D F Z
θθ+ + = + + + − + + − +++
+ + + +
& && & && & & & & & &













N G X F L F K F Q D G F G Q G





 + + = + + + + +  + 
 + + + + 
& & & && & & & &
& & &
   (4.50) 
 





L K D D G G X Z
g x
Y F L F K F Q D F Q G X F X F Z
θ θ
θ θ
   = + + + + + + + + +    + +  
&& & & & & & &  (4.51) 
 
Assume now an explicit functional form for the domestic production function 
such thatG , *X , D and Z affect domestic production (N) with constant elasticities 
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of gµ , xµ , dµ  and zµ . The production function, therefore, 
becomes * . ( , )g x d z N NN G X D Z L K
µ µ µ µ= Φ . It can now be written;  
 
( )1 * . ,g x d zg N N g GN NG X D Z L K FG G
µ µ µ µµ µ−∂  = Φ = = ∂       (4.52) 
 
( )* 1 . ,g x d zx N N x XN NG X D Z L K FX X
µ µ µ µµ µ−∂  = Φ = = ∂       (4.53) 
 
( )* 1 . ,g x d zd N N d DN NG X D Z L K FD D
µ µ µ µµ µ−∂  = Φ = = ∂       (4.54) 
 
( )* 1. ,g x d zz N N z ZN NG X D Z L K FZ Z
µ µ µ µµ µ−∂  = Φ = = ∂       (4.55) 
 
Moreover, assume an explicit functional form for the export goods production 
function such thatG and D affect export production (X) with constant elasticities of 
gη and dη . The production function of the export goods sector 
becomes . ( , )g d X XX G D L K
η η= Ψ . Derive now;  
 
( )1 . ,g dg X X g GX XG D L K QG G
η ηη η−∂  = Ψ = = ∂        (4.56) 
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( )1. ,g dd X X d DX XG D L K QD D
η ηη η−∂  = Ψ = = ∂        (4.57) 
 











N X N XY F L F K D G
D D G G
N NX X Z
X Z
θµ η µ ηθ
θ µ µθ
         = + + + + + +          +           
      + + +      +      
&& & & &
& & &
  (4.58) 
 
Dividing both sides of (4.58) by total output ( )Y  and rearranging, one could 











Y L L K K N X D N X GF F
Y Y L Y K D D Y G G Y
X N X N Z
Y X Y Z Y
θµ η µ ηθ
θ µ µθ
             = + + + + +              +               
        + + +        +        




Similar to the previous case, it is now possible to introduce the process of 
adaptive expectations of private agents regarding externalities of export expansion. The 
dynamic adjustment process of equation (4.37) is similar to the process specified with 
regards to the adaptive expectations of government institutions. Taking into consideration 
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        = − + + + +                
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  +     
&& & & &
& &
&
  (4.60) 
 
The equation (4.60) gives the determinants of economic growth. The first term is 
the lag of the growth rate. The second and third terms respectively show the effects of 
growth of population and the growth of physical capital on economic growth. The fourth 
term captures the marginal externality effects of FDI d d
N X
D D
µ ψ η ψ    +         on 
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µ ψ η ψ    +          of government 
institutions ( )G  on economic growth. The sixth term measures the effects of the sum of 
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µ ψ       on economic growth. The last term z
N
Z
µ ψ       captures the marginal 
externality effects of the interaction of exports and government institutions. 
However, the purpose here is to test how government institutions, trade, and FDI 
affect economic growth. For the estimation purposes, the equation (4.60) is parameterized 
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taking: growth of population, growth of capital stock, FDI as a share of GDP, 
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θ µ ψ ϕθ
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µ ψ δ  =            (4.67) 
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For convenience denote t
Y y
Y
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so that (4.68) can be written as;  
 
1t t t t t t t ty y l k d g x zα β γ σ τ ϕ δ−= + + + + + +       (4.69) 
 
where, y , l , d , x , g and z respectively are growth of output, population growth, FDI as a 
share of GDP, and trade as a share of GDP, strengths of government institutions, and the 
interaction term of government institutions and trade. The equation (4.30) and (4.69) are 
different only in that equation (4.69) captures the externalities of export expansion as 
well as the interaction of government institutions and trade. According to the equation 
(4.30), there is no role for exports expansion in economic growth, whereas equation 
(4.69) indicates that trade, government institutions, and their interactions determine 
growth.  
 
4. 3. Empirical Investigation 
4. 3. 1. The Empirical Models 
Since the data is not readily available for growth of capital stock, domestic 
investment as share of GDP is used (i) following Mankiw et al (1992). This is justified as 
follows: 
K sY K s i= − ∆ =&  
where s is savings as share of GDP, i is investment as share of GDP, Y is GDP, and K is 
domestic capital stock. 
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Divide this by K to get the growth of capital stock 
K Yi
K K
= − ∆&  
Assume further that the depreciation rate of capital is zero: K Yi
K K
=& . Substituting this 
into 4.23 and 4.60 the regression equation can be obtained. 
 
1it it it it it it ity y l i d g eα β γ σ τ−= + + + + +       (4.71)  
1it it it it it it it it ity y l i d g x z eα β γ σ τ ϕ δ−= + + + + + + +      (4.72) 
 
These two equations can be transformed into panel econometric models by re-
specifying the error terms as follows:  
 
1it it it it it it i t ity y l i d gα β γ σ τ µ λ ε−= + + + + + + +      (4.73) 
1it it it it it it it it i t ity y l i d g x zα β γ σ τ ϕ δ µ λ ε−= + + + + + + + + +     (4.74) 
 
where it i t ite µ λ ε= + + ; iµ , tλ  and itε  respectively are the unobserved country-specific 
effects, time-specific effects, and the standard error term.  
The data for investment share of GDP ( )i  is obtained from Penn World Tables 
(6.0). The data for growth of GDP ( )y , foreign direct investment as a share of GDP ( )d , 
population growth ( )l , and to proxy openness ( )x export as percentage of GDP, trade as 
share of GDP and tariff rate are obtained from World Bank (2003). 
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To proxy the government institutions ( )g , the 6-point composite index of 
government institutions used in the chapter three is employed. Data is not readily 
available in a cross country basis for growth of government institutions. Therefore, to 
proxy the government institutions (see appendix 6.1), a composite index of government 
institutions used in the international investment climate literature is used. It is also 
observed that this kind of indexes have been used previously in the growth regression 
framework by Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
Five year averages rather than annual observations are used due to two reasons. 
First, 5-year averages can reduce the country specific fluctuations of the data addressing 
the problem of volatility of the data. Second, in large cross country empirical exercises 
missing observations is always a problem. Use of 5-year averages rather than annual 
observations cal also address the problem. According to the availability of data, a panel 
consisting of 32 developing countries over 1978-2001 is constructed. 
The models in (4.73) and (4.74) are estimated by three panel techniques. In the 
first method, in order to address the problem of country specific unobserved effects ( )iµ , 
cross-sectional dummy variables are included. Second, the GLS technique uses the 
transformation of the models in (4.73) and (4.74) by quasi-demeaning in order to 
eliminate country specific unobserved effects ( )iµ . The GLS-estimator is a matrix of 
weighted average of within-estimator and between-estimator weighing each estimate by 
the inverse of its corresponding variance. Third, the 1-step and 2-step GMM estimates are 
estimated. The econometric properties of these two estimates were explained in the 
chapter three.    
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4. 4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
The model in (4.73) was first estimated by LSDV and GLS methods the results of 
which are reported in Table 4.1. For LSDV, the value of 2R is 0.5620 and the Wald test 
statistics show that the coefficients are jointly significant. In GLS, Wald test also suggest 
that the coefficients are jointly significant. 
 
Table 4.1: Modeling Economic Growth by LSDV and GLS 
 
Explanatory Variable LSDV-Estimator GLS-Estimator 




















 2R  = 0.5620 
W(j): 15.63 [0.008] ** 
W(d): 178.2 [0.000] ** 
AR(1) -2.486 [0.013] * 
AR(2): -3.127 [0.002] ** 
Observations= 160 
2R  = 0.2893 
W(j): 459.8 [0.000] ** 
AR(1): 0.6843 [0.494] 
AR(2): 1.151 [0.250] 
Observations= 160 
 
Note: the numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and “*” and “**” respectively indicate 
that the coefficients are significant at 1 percent and 10 percent level. 
 
The coefficient of one period lag of growth of GDP is significant in both the estimations. 
This may be due to the some econometric problems such as (a) the presence of 
heteroskedasticy and endogeneity in LSDV estimation, and (b) cross sectional dummy 
variables may not be adequately capturing the country specific unobserved effects which 
is likely to contaminate the results in LSDV estimation. However, the results of LSDV 
and GLS are not used in arriving at conclusions in this study. The conclusions are based 
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on GMM estimations. The rate of investment is positive and significant at the 10 percent 
level in LSDV and the 1 percent level in GLS. The rate of growth of population is 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level in LSDV and but not in GSL estimation. 
FDI is positive and significant at the 10 percent level but not significant at the 1 percent 
level in both estimations. The coefficient of government institutions is positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level in LSDV whereas in LSDV estimation it is insignificant 
at the 1 percent level. These results confirm the theoretical prediction that FDI and 
government institutions positively contribute to economic growth. 
 
Table 4.2: Modeling Economic Growth by LSDV and GLS 
Explanatory Variable LSDV-Estimator GLS-Estimator 
Growth of GDP (-1) ( )1y−  -0.2457 
(-2.49)* 
0.1745 
(2.38)*   
Foreign Direct Investment (% of 





















Interaction Term ( )z  -- -- 
 2R = 0.5716 
W(j): 23.64 [0.00] ** 




2R = 0.3148 
W(j): 498.6 [0.00] ** 
AR(1):0.6231 [0.533] 
AR(2): 1.323 [0.186] 
Observations= 160 
 
Note: the numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and “*” and “**” respectively indicate 
that the coefficients are significant at 1 percent and 10 percent level. 
 
One of the most important concerns in the results given in Table 4.1 is the negative 
significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in LSDV estimation. Also, there 
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is a substantial difference of the coefficients in LSDV and GLS methods. This makes the 
results suspicious. This may be due to the some econometric problems such as (a) the 
presence of heteroskedasticy and endogeneity in LSDV estimation, and (b) cross 
sectional dummy variables may not be adequately capturing the country specific 
unobserved effects which is likely to contaminate the results in LSDV estimation. This 
will require using dynamic panel techniques to sole these econometric issues. However, 
the results of LSDV and GLS are not used in arriving at conclusions in this study. The 
conclusions are based on GMM estimations.  
Table 4.3: Modeling Economic Growth by LSDV and GLS with Interaction Term 
Explanatory Variable LSDV-Estimator GLS-Estimator 




Foreign Direct Investment (% of 

























 2R = 0.6279 
W(j): 81.72 [0.00] ** 




2R = 0.2941 
W(j): 445.9[0.00] ** 
AR(1):0.5476 [0.584] 
AR(2): 1.280 [0.201] 
Observations= 160 
Note: the numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and “*” and “**” respectively indicate 
that the coefficients are significant at 1 percent and 10 percent level. 
 
The regression in (4.74) was first estimated by LSDV and GLS without the 
interaction term of trade share and government institutions (Table 4.2). In this case also 
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the lagged growth rate is negative and significant. FDI as a share of GDP, the trade share, 
and government institutions positively impact on economic growth.14 These results are 
consistent with the previous case. The inclusion of an index of trade share remarkably 
improves the quality of the regression results. 
 
Table 4.4: Modeling Economic Growth by GMM 
Explanatory Variable 1-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 












Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 

















 W: 63.06 [0.00] * 
Sarg: 97.7 [0.0]* 
AR(1): -3.0 [0.00] * 
AR(2): -1.8 [0.06] 
Observations= 160 





Note: The numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and “*” indicates that the coefficients 
are significant at 10 percent level.  
 
The equation in (4.74) was then estimated incorporating an interaction of trade 
share and government institutions by LSDV and GLS (Table 4.3). The purpose of the 
difference is to identify the importance of the interaction effect of trade and government 
institutions. FDI, the trade share, and government positively impact on economic growth. 
                                                 
14 When explaining the individual effects of trade share and government institutions, the 
effects of the interaction term was taken into consideration, even if it is not mentioned in 
the text.  
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The inclusion of an interaction term significantly improves the overall results.  The 
interaction term is negative and significant at the 1 percent level in LSDV estimation and 
negative but not significant at least at the 10 percent level in GLS estimation. 
 
Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix 
 FDI GOVT.INST GPOP INVEST TRADE 
FDI 1 0.5715 -0.0667 0.5877 0.6028 
GOVT.INST 0.5715 1 -0.3108 0.5400 0.6502 
GPOP -0.0667 -0.3108 1 -0.2334 0.1186 
INVEST 0.5877 0.5400 -0.2334 1 0.4484 
TRADE 0.6028 0.6502 0.1186 0.4484 1 
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; GOVT.INST = government institutions index; 
GPOP = population growth; INVEST = rate of investment; TRADE = trade share. 
 
The results of the 1-step and 2-step method in the models including an interaction 
term of trade openness and the government institutions are reported in Table 4.4. In both 
the models the Sargan test scores confirms validity of the IVs. Similarly, AR (2) serial 
correlation is not detected in both models. Inclusion of the interaction term improves the 
results of both the models remarkably. Openness and government institutions positively 
contribute to economic growth. However, this estimation confirms that even if the 
interaction term is negative it is not significant at least the 10 percent level.  
Even though the theoretical model predicts the interaction term of openness and 
government institutions to be significantly affecting economic growth, empirical 
evidence obtained so far does not confirm it. This leads to make a sensitivity analysis. 
The correlation matrix for the whole sample of countries was obtained (Table 4.5). It 
clearly shows that the strengths of government institutions index and trade share are 
correlated (0.6502). Trade share and FDI inflows are positively correlated (0.6028). 
Moreover, the rate of investment and FDI (0.5877), investment and government 
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institutions (0.5400) are correlated. This correlation may be creating problems in the 
model. It is possible to drop the investment variable and estimate the model for empirical 
estimation. 
 
Table 4.6: Determinants of Growth of GDP by GMM 
Explanatory Variable 1-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 




Population Growth Rate ( )l  2.1072 
(3.19)* 
  2.1072 
(2.94)* 
Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 

















 W(j): 17.12 [0.00] ** 









Note: The numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and “*” indicates that the coefficients 
are significant at 10 percent level. 
 
Table 4.7: Correlation Matrix 
 FDI GOVT.INST G.POP INVEST TARIFF 
FDI 1 0.5715 -0.0667 0.38771 -0.2917 
GOVT.INST 0.5715 1 -0.3108 0.5400 -0.6531 
G.POP -0.0667 -0.3108 1 -0.2334 0.4286 
INVEST 0.3877 0.5400 -0.2334 1 -0.4224 
TARIFF -0.2917 -0.6531 0.4286 -0.4224 1 
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment; GOVT.INST = government institutions index; 
GPOP = population growth; INVEST = rate of investment; TARIFF = Tariff Rate. 
 
The equation was re-estimated by GMM by dropping the rate of investment 
variable. The results of which are reported in Table 4.6. In this case both trade share and 
67 
government institutions significantly positively impact on growth, while there is 
significant negative interaction term. 
Second, since the trade share is often a weak measure of openness it is possible to 
use an alternative measure of openness. The tariff rate can be used instead of trade share. 
The correlation matrix including average tariff rate is reported in the Table 4.7. In this 
case also, investment and government institutions are correlated (0.5400). The tariff rate 
and government institutions are also correlated (-0.6531). But average tariff rate is not 
significantly correlated with any other variable. Therefore, average tariff rate is a better 
measure to proxy openness. 
 
Table 4.8: Modeling Economic Growth by GMM 
Explanatory Variable 1-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 












Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 

















 W(j): 21.1 [0.00] * 
Sarg:11.48 [0.17] 
AR(1): -2.27 [0.02] * 
AR(2): -1.04 [0.29] 
Observations= 160 
W(j): 28.4[0.00] *




Note: The numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and “*” indicates that the coefficients 




The results of GMM estimation are reported in Table 4.8. The coefficient of the 
average tariff rate is negative and significant indicating that more trade barriers means 
less growth. The government institutions positively affect growth. The interaction term is 
negative and significant. This model is re-estimated by dropping the rate of investment 
variable, the results of which are reported in Table 4.9. The results are consistent with the 
previous case. 
 
Table 4.9: Modeling Economic Growth by GMM 
Explanatory Variable 1-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 








Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 

















 W(j): 17.1 [0.00] * 
Sarg: 10.20 [0.17] 
AR(1): -2.24 [0.02] * 
AR(2): -1.227 [0.22] 
Observations= 160 
W(j): 22.6 [0.0]* 




Note: The numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and “*” indicates that the coefficients 
are significant at 10 percent level. 
 
The purpose of the theoretical exercise of the model is to explain the role of 
openness and government institutions in growth. Therefore, in theoretical modeling an 
export sector was considered. However, in order to find if these conclusions are basically 
consistent, the regressions are re-estimated using the export share instead of trade share to 
proxy openness. The results are reported in the Table 4.10. These results indicate that 
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export share and government institutions positively affect growth, their interaction 
negatively affects growth.   
Table 4.10: Modeling Economic Growth by GMM 
Explanatory Variable 1-Step GMM 2-Step GMM 




Rate of Investment ( )i  0.1926 
(1.61) 
0.25727(1.01) 




















 W: 99.69 [0.00] * 
Sarg: 48.18[0.00] * 
AR(1): -2.64 [0.00]* 
 AR(2): -1.46[0.14] 
Observations= 160 
W: 46.48 [0.00]*  




Note: The numbers in the parenthesis are t-values and “*” indicates that the coefficients 
are significant at 10 percent level. 
4. 5. Concluding Remarks 
 The theoretical model predicted that if openness, government institutions, and 
their interactions generate externalities, they positively contribute to economic growth. 
The empirical results confirm this. The partial/independent effects of government 
institutions and openness are affected by the interaction term.  
The partial/marginal effects of government institutions and openness are affected 
by the interaction term. In order to find any partial effect with interaction term we have to 
take the partial derivative of each argument. The partial (independent) effects of openness 
and government institutions will be higher if the interaction term is positive. On the other 
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hand, when the interaction term is negative the partial (independent) effects of openness 
and government institutions will be lower. This means that the partial (independent) 
effects of openness and government institutions are enhanced if the interaction term is 
positive and weakened when the interaction term is negative. The interaction of export 
share and public institutions and the interaction of tariff rate and public institutions have 
the negative significant signs even though export share and tariff rates independently 
have positive and negative relations respectively in our results. 
The significant negative coefficient of the interaction of public institutions and external 
openness indicates that there are negative feedbacks between these two. The feedbacks 
between openness and government institutions can take various forms, viz., greater 
openness may compel government to improve rule of law, adopt social safety nets, 
improve the security of private properties; greater openness tend to weaken predatory 
behavior of the government reducing rent-seeking and/or corruption; governments with 
protectionist ideologies tend to create impediments to international trade and investment; 
greater openness entails regulatory institutions to curtail the abuse of dominant positions; 
governments with weak institutions would fail to manage external shocks arising from 
greater openness; and weak public institutions tend to retard inflows of foreign 
investment by raising information costs, political risk, operational costs. In our case, it 
appears that weak institutions generate negative feedbacks on openness, or vise versa. 
These feedbacks indicate that greater openness entails good public institutions, or vise 
versa for the interaction term to be positive thereby to increase the partial effects of 
openness and institutions. Strong or good government institutions are favourable for 
higher growth (see, Appendix 6.1). 
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CHAPTER-V 
ENDOGENOUS GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND EXTERNAL 
OPENNESS IN A GROWTH MODEL 
5. 1. Introduction 
  The empirics of the relationship between government institutions, external 
openness and economic growth are fairly extensive, though inconclusive, but the 
theoretical literature is limited. Eicher & Penalosa (2003) have attempted to fill this void 
by introducing endogenous institutions into an R&D based growth model. They study 
how incentives to protect and exploit intellectual property rights affect economic growth 
showing market size is a crucial determinant of both the existence and the quality of 
institutions.  
The chapter four explained the role of external openness and government 
institutions in economic growth in a three sector model in which if openness and 
institutions generate positive externalities they positively contribute to growth. However, 
this chapter considers the role of openness and institutions in fostering technological 
progress. Not only institutions but also external openness is likely to facilitate 
innovations. Anti-openness policies alongside weak institutions are thought to reduce 
incentives for investing in R&D works. Rent-seeking literature advocates the adoption of 
anti-protectionist policies for countering predatory behavior aimed at increasing resource 
allocation efficiency (Krueger 1974). The role of endogenous external openness is 
considered here in line with this argument. Innovators are assumed to prefer more open 
external economic regimes since enhanced external openness reduces predatory activities 
thereby fosters innovations. 
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The fourth chapter empirically showed that both government institutions and 
external openness positively contribute to economic growth. However, endogenous 
openness and institutions were not explained. This chapter tries to fill that void by 
developing a theoretical model incorporating the exogenous and endogenous external 
openness into the R&D based endogenous growth framework (Eicher and Penalosa 
2003). 
Trade is often thought to be an incomplete measure of openness since there are 
other crucial factors to be taken into consideration when discussing about external 
openness (see, for instance, Baldwin 2003). Openness is defined in a broader sense to 
cover not only the degree to which an economy limits the free flow of goods and services 
both into and out of its domestic economy, but also to represent exchange rate policies, 
domestic taxes and subsidies, competition and other regulatory policies, and education 
policies (Baldwin 2003). 
Due to these concerns, it is not satisfactory to model the role of exports and 
imports to address the role of external openness fully compelling one to analyze as to 
how the ‘degree of external openness’ is determined and how endogenous openness 
affect growth in an economy. In recent times, individual countries are forced to devote 
resources to manage the ever complicating external trading system even in the most open 
economies in the world because of the economic globalization. Making and managing of 
trade policy has become complex and difficult to undertake in the new globalizing 
environment because it involves a whole range of issues which not necessarily trade 
issues. The theoretical formulation in this chapter considers the trade policy making and 
managing rather than trade volume when discussing about external openness. This model 
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is a modification of Eicher and Penalosa’s (2003) model.  Eicher and Penalosa’s (2003) 
explain the role of institutions in economic growth in an R&D based growth model. The 
model in this thesis incorporates exogenous and endogenous openness (x) into this 
framework. 
 
5. 2. The Model 
5. 2. 1. The Structure of the Model 
The production structure of the model is formulated such that there are different 
types of labour (Jones 1995, Arnold 2000) in the economy. Government institutions and 
external openness in this model relate only to the ability of innovators to protect their 
intellectual property rights. 
The constant relative risk aversion utility function of identical individuals, whose 










− −∞ −= ∫ −         (5.1) 
C is consumption. U is instantaneous utility function which is an increasing 
function of C. σ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion which is independent of 
growth of consumption in this specification. Because of this there is no uncertainty. 
σ also determines household’s willingness to shift consumption between different 
periods: the smaller is  σ , the more slowly marginal utility falls as consumption rises, 
and so the more willing the household is to allow its consumption to vary overtime. Ifσ is 
                                                 
15 The notations used here may be different from what were used in the previous chapters.  
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close to zero, utility is almost linear in C, and so the household is willing to accept large 
swings in its consumption to take advantage of small differences between its discount 
rate and the rate of return it gets on its savings. ρ  is the discount rate. The greater is ρ , 
the less is the household values future consumption relative to current consumption. 
The production of final goods ( )Y is a function of labour ( )YL and a number of 





YY L h j dj
α α−= ∫          (5.2) 
 
where A is number of different intermediate inputs or innovations or blueprints; 
h  is the amount of each intermediate input used; and YL is employment in the final goods 
sector. Let,  
 
0 ( )
AK h j dj= ∫  
 
Assuming that equal quantities of all intermediates are used, K  can be written 
as K Ah= , so that; 
 
( )1Y AL Kα α−=          (5.3) 
 
Physical capital accumulates according to the following equation; 
( ) ( ) ( )K Y C B Z E M= − + − + −&        (5.4) 
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where K is physical capital, B is capital inflows, Z is capital outflows, E is exports, and 
M is imports. If we assume that the capital account of the balance of payment on 
equilibrium, ( ) 0B Z− = so that: ( ) ( )K Y C E M= − + −& . 
 
The analysis assumes that the trade balance is zero to avoid the effects of disequilibrium 
in the balance of payments on the analysis. 
 




=&           (5.5) 
 
where RL is employment in research sector, a  is productivity of researchers. 
  
If AP  is the price of new identical blueprints, assuming monopolistic competition, 





Y P L h
h
α αα − −∂ = =∂   ∀  i         (5.6) 
 
Monopoly price is given by: 
 
(1 )iP phα= −           (5.7) 
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( ) ( )t r s dsA tP e d
τ π τ τ−∫∞= ∫         (5.8) 
 











=&  at the steady state, AP r
π= . 
These results are consistent with those of Eicher and Penalosa (2003). 
 
5. 2. 2. Exogenous Government Institutions and External openness 
Denote institutions and degree of external openness by g and x  respectively. 
Assume further that (0,1)g∈ and (0,1)x∈ ; where 1g = represents best institutions and 
1x = means complete openness. Innovators receive only a fraction of earnings of the 
innovations which is a function of government institutions and degree of 
openness ( )AgxP . One part of the earnings of innovations is misappropriated[ ](1 ) Agx P− . 





which is now a function of institutions and external openness, AR
gxP Aw
a
= . (1 ) Agx P A− &  
is the misappropriated portion of innovations by predators; Lw  is wages of the predators. 
 
(1 ) /L L A RL w gx P AL a= −         (5.10) 
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Assuming workers are paid according to their marginal products, differentiate 
production function with respect to YL  for obtaining wage rate of workers in the final 
goods sector; 
 
( )1(1 ) Y
Y
Y A L K
L
α α αα − −∂ = −∂  
 
Multiply both sides by YL  to get; 
 
(1 ) /Y Yw Y Lα= −          (5.11) 
 

















α−=          (5.12) 
 
 







 = −  
&
         (5.13) 
 
Equating wages of research workers and those of predators ( )R Lw w= , 
 
(1 )A A R
L













−=           (5.14) 
 
Equilibrium in the labour market requires; 
 
Y R LL L L L= + +  
R Y LL L L L= − −   
1
R Y R
gxL L L L
gx
 −= − −     
[ ]R YL gx L L= −          (5.15) 
 
This gives, 
* /gxL ay α ρα σ
−= +          (5.16) 
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Equation (5.16) highlights two important features. First, rate of growth depends on 
efficiency of researchers, strengths of institutions, and degree of external openness. 
Second, the growth rate will be lower when agents are unwilling to substitute 
consumption inter-temporally (σ is large) and are more impatient ( ρ  is large).  
 
5. 2. 3. Endogenous Government Institutions and External openness 
One of the noteworthy unrealistic features of the previous framework is its 
treatment of government institutions and external openness as exogenous even though 
these are likely to be endogenously determined. Institutions are built and maintained in 
any society in response to the demand for them by the society. Nature of the external 
economic policies of an economy is determined according to the demand for it. If a 
government attempts to liberalize the economy beyond a socially desirable level, there 
will be strict resistance. Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that the degree of external 
openness in an economy is not exogenously given. The scarce resources need to be 
allocated for building and maintaining institutions as well as for managing external 
economic policies. 
Some recent studies have lamented the possibilities of endogenous institutions. Aghion et 
al (2002), for instance, in a model of political institutions explain how institutions are 
endogenously chosen by economic agents. They argue that political institutions 
contribute to determining the choice of economic policies, which, in turn, determine 
economic success. Institutions themselves are developed by individuals and they evolve 
in response to changing politico-economic conditions. A society needs to devote scarce 
resources to establish and improve necessary government institutions for its best-
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interests. Thus, in order to fully understand the economic effects of government 
institutions on economic growth, one has to allow for the endogenous evolution of the 
institutions. Economic agents do respond to economic incentives. When agents are aware 
of the rents lost due to predation, they possess incentives to improve strengths of 
government institutions. There is clear evidence for the fact that a fraction of workers in 
the population is engaged in building and maintaining government institutions. However, 
the efforts of workers in institutions-building sector need to be compensated. Exploiting 
the insights from the political economy literature, it is stipulated that profit-maximizing 
agents find it in their interest to spend resources to protect their own property rights. In 
the present case innovators realize that part of the value of innovations is misappropriated 
which is determined by the strengths of government institutions. Hence, it is their interest 
to hire institution-building workers or property rights protecting workers. In this 
specification, it is assumed that innovators hire property rights protecting workers since 
lack of security of intellectual properties affects the profitability of innovations. In this 
case  GL  is hired by innovators. However, this specification is done by Eicher and 
Penalosa (2003). What the thesis has done here is to introduce the external policy sector 
into this model to incorporate the effects of openness on growth.  
To approximate the process of institution-building, following formulation is 
utilized (Eicher and Penalosa 2003); 
 




∂ >∂ , 0
F
L
∂ <∂ , (0, ) 0F L =   (5.17) 
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where GL  and L are labour used in the institutions-building sector and total labour 
approximated by population respectively.  
Endogenous external openness is also incorporated here into this framework to 
capture the importance of openness together with government institutions in an integrated 
framework. Aizenman et al (2003) first argued for endogenous financial openness in a 
model showing how more open commercial policy increases the effective cost of 
enforcing financial repression, rendering financial openness a by-product of greater trade 
integration. Likewise, there is potentially a reverse causality process in which greater 
financial openness may encourage capital inflows, especially FDI. These adjustments 
may facilitate more commercial trade. Frankel and Cavallo (2004) revealed a number of 
ways in which external openness can be endogenous. First, external openness could be 
endogenous via income in that richer countries tend to liberalize trade barriers in part 
because their means of public finance shift from tariff revenue to income or value added 
taxes. Second, trade liberalization could be part of a more general reform strategy driven 
by pro-globalization philosophy. Other aspects of such a reform program, such as 
privatization, financial liberalization, or macroeconomic stabilization might affect the 
probability of crises. Third, external openness could be endogenous because experience 
with crises may itself cause liberalization, via programmes advocated by international 
financial organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Otherwise, if a country’s 
response to crises is disillusionment with globalization, it might have the opposite effect. 
Fourth, external openness could be endogenous through the feedback between trade and 
financial openness. However, external openness can also be endogenous because 
innovators respond to economic incentives. Innovators, who are aware of the rents lost 
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due to predation, possess incentives to devote resources to manage external economic 
policies for reducing incidence of rent seeking. Due to these reasons innovators take into 
consideration the degree of external openness when maximizing their net income. The 
formulation here takes into consideration the fact that the smaller economies, expressed 
in terms of population, need to maintain more openness than the larger economies do. 
When x  is specified as the degree of openness, it shows that higher the labour 
devoted to the external policy sector the higher is the degree of external openness. It is 
assumed that the innovators prefer more open economic policies, so that they prefer a 
bigger external policy sector. Therefore, they devote more human resources for export 
production. The more they invest in export sector, the higher will be the labour in that 
sector indicating that the economy is more export oriented. According to this 
specification, x is an increasing function of xL . The degree of external openness is 
determined by the following function; 
 




∂ >∂  , 0
H
L
∂ <∂ , (0, ) 0H L =    (5.18) 
 
where XL  and L are manpower in managing external economic policies and total labour 
or population respectively.  
It is now possible to explain the short-run equilibrium in the labour market. 
Innovators choose the number of workers in the institutions building and external policy 
sectors with a view to safeguarding their intellectual property rights so as to maximize 





Max  [ ] [ ], , /R G X A G G X XL F L L H L L P A a w L w Lπ = − −    (5.19) 
 
















η=          (5.20) 
 
















µ=          (5.22) 
 
Free entry into research sector implies that wage payments to workers of R&D sector, 
institutions-building sector, and external policy sector must exhaust the return from 
innovations; 
( )1 AR gxP Aw aη µ= − −         (5.23) 
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The wages of all sectors should be equal in the equilibrium. The wage of research 
workers is equal to that of institutions-building workers ( )R Gw w=  so that; 
 
( )1 A AR
G
gxP A gxP AL
a aL










− −=      (5.24) 
 
By equating wages of research workers and external policy sector workers ( )R Gw w= ; 
 
( )1 A AR
X
gxP A gxP AL
a aL





η µ= − −  ( )1X RL L
µ
η µ= − −       (5.25) 
 
By equating wages of research workers and that of predators ( )R Lw w= ; 
 
( )1 (1 )A RA
L
gxP A Lgx P A
a aL








L gx η µ





−= − −      (5.26) 
 















−=          (5.27)  
 
In order to get the relationship between the labour in institutions-building and 








− −= − −  
X GL L
µ
η=           (5.28) 
 
By equating wages of research sector and wages of final goods production 
sector ( )R Yw w= , it is possible to get the price of blueprints at the equilibrium; 
 
(1 ) (1 ) /A YgxP A Y La







−= − −         (5.29) 
 




Y R L G XL L L L L L= + + + +         (5.30) 
 
In order to obtain the equilibrium level of labour in the institutions-building 
sector, substitute for ,R LL L  and XL into (5.30); 
 
( )G YL L L gxη= −          (5.31) 
( ) ,t Yg F L L gx Lη= −           (5.32) 
 
To obtain the equilibrium level of labour in the external policy sector, substitute 





[ ]X YL L L gxµ ηη= −  
( )X YL L L gxµ= −          (5.33) 
( ) ,t Yx H L L gx Lµ= −           (5.34) 
 
Substitute from (5.31) into (5.24) to get the equilibrium level of labour in the 
research sector,  
 
( ) [ ]1R YL L L gxη µ ηη
− −= −  
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( )[ ]1R YL L L gxη µ= − − −         (5.35) 
 
To get the equilibrium level of predatory labour, substitute from (5.31) into 
(5.26);  
 
[ ](1 )L YgxL L L gxgx ηη
−= −  
[ ](1 )L YL gx L L= − −          (5.36) 
 
Equation (5.36) demonstrates that if a country maintains best level of institutions 
( 1g = ) and complete external openness ( 1x = ) there will be no predatory labour (i.e., 
0LL = ).  
It is now possible to derive the short-run and long-run equilibrium rates of growth 
of the economy. Suppose, C
K
χ = ; Yz
K




−=& ; ( )K Y C B E M= − + − −& . When 
the balance of payments is on equilibrium, K Y C= −& . The marginal product in the final 
goods sector is given by p zα=  and the price of intermediate goods is given 
by rp α= which means
2r zα= . Growth of physical capital to consumption ratio can be 













−  = − −  
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( )r zχ ρ χχ σ
−= − +&  
2z zχ α ρ χχ σ







L L gxL z z z
L a
η µ χα
− − −= − + −−
& &
      (5.38) 
 




P LY A g x
P Y A L g x
 = − + − −  
&& && & &
         (5.39) 
 





Y A L K
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& && &
        (5.40) 
 
Since K Y z
K Y z
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Y A L Y z
α α   = − + + −     
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Y Y A L z
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z A L Y
α
α
  − = + −       
& & &&
       (5.41) 
 
Taking into account the fact that innovators receive only a fraction of the value of 











gx LY A g xr L
Y a A L g x
η µ α− −  = − + + + +  
& && & &
     (5.42) 
 
Substitute (5.42) into (5.41) to get; 
 
( )1(1 ) Y Y
Y
Y Y
gxL Lz A A g xr L
z A L a A L g x
η µ αα
α
 − −   − = + − + − + − −           




gxz g xL r
z a g x
η µ αα
α
− − − = − − −     
& &&
       
( ) ( )1 1 11 Ygxz g xL zz a g x
η µα α α α
− − = − − − −  
& &&
     (5.43) 
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This system can be used to solve for the steady state relationship between 
employment in the final goods sector, government institutions, and external policy sector 





0z zα ρ χσ
− − + =  
 
 
2zz α ρχ σ σ= − +           (5.44) 
 






=&  so that from (5.44); 
 
( ) ( ) ( )11 1 0Ygx L za








− −=           (5.46) 
 




=&  in (4.42) and substitute from (5.45); 
 
( )(1 ) 0YL L gx z
a
η µ χ− − −− + − =  
91 
( ) 2(1 ) 0YL L gx zz z
a
η µ α ρ
σ σ
− − −− + − + − =  
( ) 2(1 ) YL L gx z
a
η µ α ρ
σ σ




( ) ( )2(1 ) 1Y
Y
L L gx gx
L
a a
η µ η µα ρ
σ α σ
− − − − −− + =  
 
( ) ( )1 (1 ) Y
Y
gx L L gx
L
a a
η µ η µα ρ
σ σ
− − − − −− =  
( ) ( )1 Y YL L Lgx
a
α σ ρη µ σ σ
− − − − =  
 




η µ α σ σ= − − + −        (5.48) 
 
It is now possible to express the rate of growth under endogenous government 
institutions and external openness in the short-run. According to the structure of this 
model, employment in all sectors is constant at the steady state. The only input in final 
goods production that grows overtime is the number of intermediate goods available. 
Thus, the growth rate of the economy at the steady state is RLAy
A a
= =&  and 
since ( )(1 )R YL L L gxη µ= − − − ; 
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( ) ( )* (1 ) YL Ly gx
a
η µ− − −=         (5.49) 
 
The equation (5.49) demonstrates that government institutions and external 
openness positively contribute to economic growth. The equation (5.49), however, 
indicates that the elasticity of institutions plus elasticity of external openness should be 
strictly less than unity [ ]( ) 1η µ+ < for a positive growth rate to exist. In order to get the 
long-run equilibrium growth rate ( )*y of the economy, substitute from (5.48) into (5.49); 
 
( )





L L x ay
a x L L
η µ ρ
η µ α σ σ
− − −= − − + −      
 
( )






−= + −         (5.50) 
 
In the long-run, the economy grows because of innovations. Resources devoted to 
improving the degree of external openness, and improving the strengths of institutions 
contribute to fostering innovations and then economic growth. External openness and 
institutions affect long-run economic growth by reducing rent-seeking and enhancing 
innovations.  
Though the study is mainly focus on studying the developing country cases, this is 
not mainly targeted for developing countries. The purpose is to explain the endogenous 
openness and government institutions in economic growth without specifically applying 
to particular countries. However, the model presented here may not be applicable to 
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developing countries because the models with steady state properties are not suitable for 
developing countries. The steady state properties are not applicable to developing 
countries. The main argument presented here may be applicable to developing countries. 
The innovations in this model represent a broader sense, at least similar to Romer 1993, 
in which Romer specifies the innovations to denote ideas creation which is important for 
developing countries. In this sense developing countries are also need to create new ideas 
to increase economic growth. The basic theoretical prediction of this model mainly 
applies for developed countries. This is why the chapters do not specify that this model 

















IN QUEST FOR PUZZLING GROWTH PERFORMANCE IN SRI 
LANKA: A CASE STUDY   
6. 1. Introduction 
For nearly sixty-year old post-independent growth experience in Sri Lanka, the 
path of economic growth is characterized by contradictions and puzzles. A comparison 
between the purchasing-power adjusted per-capita GDP published by Penn World Tables 
(6.0) between Sri Lanka and East Asian high performing economies (HPEs) tells the 
story well. In 1960, the per-capita income in Singapore, Korea, and Malaysia were almost 
comparable to that of Sri Lanka (Figure 6.1). However, the average income in Malaysia, 
Korea, and Singapore were at least three-times higher than that of Sri Lanka in 2000. The 
per-capita incomes between these economies have enormously diverged within four 
decades (Figure 6.1). Singapore diverged from the other three economies in the mid-
1960s, while Korea and Malaysia diverged from Sri Lanka in the 1970s. Despite the high 
enthusiasm for rapid growth, the per-capita GDP growth rate in Sri Lanka over the past 
few decades has remained, on average, below 3 percent (World Bank 2003). In fact, Sri 
Lanka has maintained slow but steady growth amid experiencing twin conflicts: ethnic 
conflict and social uprisings (Athukorala and Jayasuriya 2004), while most developing 
countries with ethnic tensions and other social disturbances have experienced economic 
disasters (Easterly and Levine 1997). The growth performance in Sri Lanka during the 































































Data Source: Penn World Tables 6.0. 
 
Regardless of the poor growth performance over the past few-decades, Sri Lanka 
has recorded considerable level of human development. The data from World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2003) reveals the following. First, life expectancy 
at birth during 1995-2000 in Sri Lanka was about 67 years while Singapore, Korea, and 
Malaysia have respectively recorded 71, 65, and 65 years. Second, adults’ literacy rate in 
Sri Lanka was about 91 percent during the same period whereas Singapore, Korea, and 
Malaysia have respectively recorded about 92, 97, and 86 percent. Finally, the Barro-Lee 
measure of average years of schooling provides the similar kind of evidence. In 2000, the 
values of Barro-Lee measure of average schooling for Sri Lanka, Singapore, Korea, and 
Malaysia respectively were 6.9, 7, 10.8, and 6.8 (CID, Harvard University). All these 
evidence confirm that Sri Lanka’s performance in human development is comparable to 
that of the most of the upper middle income economies. 
Growth theories as well as the cross-country growth regressions have confirmed 
that the countries with better initial conditions grow faster (Barro 1991). Both HPEs and 
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Sri Lanka recorded very impressive initial conditions in the 1960s. First, the level of 
initial human capital in Sri Lanka was quite similar to those of HPEs. Second, the initial 
per-capita incomes were almost the same in all four economies (Penn World Tables 6.0). 
Third, the initial growth rate in Sri Lanka was similar to Korea, but somewhat lower than 
those of Singapore and Malaysia (World Bank 2003). Finally, these countries initially 
maintained relatively stable political systems and government institutions. 
It is puzzling as to why Sri Lanka maintained weak economic growth even though 
it has recorded impressive initial conditions, has experienced a relatively liberalized 
economic regime at least for the past three decades, and has achieved relatively higher 
human development. One may want to attribute slow economic growth in Sri Lanka to 
political instability inflicted by the twin conflicts: ethnic conflict and Marxist engineered 
armed rebellion. Though ethnic conflict might have caused negatively on economic 
growth, poor economic growth itself might have contributed to ethnic tensions. But, the 
average per-capita GDP growth rate in Sri Lanka for the past three decades has been 
higher than that of South Asian, African and Latin American regions, albeit lower than 
that of the East Asian & Pacific region. The growth performance in Sri Lanka has been 
far from dismal even under severe strains of political instability (Stewart and O’Sullivan 
1999).  
This chapter attempts to relate the theoretical and cross-country empirical findings 
of the previous chapters regarding the role of institutions and external openness with 
reference to the case of Sri Lanka. The chapter examines as to whether external openness 
and government institutions have contributed to economic growth in Sri Lanka. The 
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chapter contains a critical evaluation followed by a discussion of simple growth 
regressions.   
6. 2. Foreign Investment Inflows 
In an attempt to analyze the determinants of economic growth in Sri Lanka, the 
role of foreign investment needs to be examined. Foreign official development assistance 
(FDA) has continued to play an important role in Sri Lanka for financing investment even 
though there has been a sharp decrease in inflows of FDA in the recent times (Table 6.1). 
There have been compelling reasons for Sri Lanka to be relying on FDA. First, Sri Lanka 
undertook a policy of deficit budgets and looked for FDA for financing the deficits 
during 1980s and 1990s. Second, there had been an increased enthusiasm on the part of 
the donors to tie-up FDA with economic reforms. Third, ethnic war has compelled the 
country to depend more on FDA due to the limitations of tax revenues at the time of 
escalating war. FDA funds appeared to have been diverted to waging the war. Fourth, the 
increased social and political turbulences engineered by Marxist rebels followed by 
killings and vandalizing of government properties forced government to seek FDA both 
for countering unrest with various social welfare programmes and rebuilding of 
vandalized government properties. Fifth, governments looked for FDA as the last resort 
to finance investment to meet the high growth targets since domestic savings was low and 
other foreign capital was not adequately forthcoming. Sixth, government of Sri Lanka 
undertook massive multi-task development projects in the form of irrigation and 
infrastructure development during 1978-88, the funds for which were mainly channeled 
from FDA. Finally, the government had to subsidize the relatively larger loss-making 
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government sector enterprises which turned to the government financing to cover-up 
losses. 
 
Table 6.1: Aggregate FDA (net) as Percentage of GDP 
Year Singapore Korea Malaysia Sri Lanka 
1960-64 0.02 7.42 0.62 0.65 
1965-69 0.41 5.38 0.72 1.95 
1970-74 0.99 2.68 0.76 2.23 
1975-79 0.15 0.63 0.64 6.91 
1980-84 0.14 0.14 0.65 8.81 
1985-89 0.16 0.01 0.68 8.36 
1990-94 0.00 -0.01 0.46 7.56 
1995-2000 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 2.91 
1960-2000 0.22 1.93 0.54 4.78 
Data Source: computed using World Bank’s (2003) data. 
 
 
Table 6.2: FDI Inflows as Percentage of GDP 
Year Singapore Korea Malaysia Sri Lanka 
1970-74 6.85 - 2.85 0.01 
1975-79 5.23 0.19 3.06 0.28 
1980-84 9.28 0.09 4.05 0.95 
1985-89 10.71 0.44 2.31 0.54 
1990-94 10.29 0.26 7.10 1.13 
1995-2000 10.69 1.08 4.55 1.29 
1960-2000 8.91 0.49 3.89 0.72 
Source: Computed using World Bank’s (2002) data. 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is another complementary source of investment. 
Throughout 1960-2001, Sri Lanka on average has attracted FDI as a percentage of GDP 
0.72 while Singapore and Malaysia have respectively attracted 8.91 and 3.89 percents 
(Table 6.2). The rate of investment to GDP in HPEs has been above 30 percent for the 
past three decades, the contribution of FDI to this effect has been considerable in 
Singapore and Malaysia. Furthermore, the small percentage attracted by Sri Lanka 
relative to the size of the economy has confined to manufacturing enclaves (Athukorala 
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and Jayasuriya 2004), which does not have adequate linkages with the domestic 
economy. 
We do not detect a significant relationship between aggregate FDA and FDI 
inflows in Sri Lanka. For the past four decades, Sri Lanka has attracted much of 
multilateral aid, while bilateral flows were very small (OECD 2002). Therefore, the focus 
here is on multilateral aid and FDI inflows. We construct the relation between 
multilateral flows and FDI inflows. In order to find out the relationship between 
multilateral FDA inflows and FDI inflows in Sri Lanka, the scatter plot of multilateral 
FDA and FDI is constructed which shows a negative relationship between the two 
(Figure 6.2). The multilateral FDA inflows appear to have functioned as a substitute for 
FDI inflows in Sri Lanka. These are consistent with cross-country findings.  
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Data Source: OECD (2002) 
6. 3. Pressure of High Inflation 
High inflation has often been a central issue in policy debates. Sri Lanka has 
generally experienced high inflation. In the early 1960s, the inflation in Sri Lanka was 
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similar to that of HPEs. The average rate of inflation for 1960-2000 in Singapore, Korea, 
Malaysia, and Sri Lanka respectively was 2.96, 3.43, 9.71, and 8.48 percent (World Bank 
2003). Inflation in Sri Lanka has remained at around 9 percent per year since 1970s. 
Even though, inflation controlling has become one of the mantras in policy-
circles, empirical evidence of the impact of inflation on growth is scarce. A study by 
Barro (1995) for a panel of 100 countries finds that rate of inflation negatively impact on 
growth in the short-run. Moreover, Andres and Hernando (1997) analyzed the correlation 
between economic growth and inflation in OECD countries. They find that even low or 
moderate inflation rates have a temporary negative impact on growth rates, leading to 
significant and permanent reductions in per capita income. Therefore, the effects of 
inflation need to be controlled in the growth regressions.   
 
6. 4. External Openness 
Post-independent policy transformation in Sri Lanka has been documented in a 
number of studies (Athukorala 1999, Athukorala and Jayasuriya 1994). Sri Lanka has 
often been thought to be one of the most liberalized economies in the developing world 
which needs further clarifications. In this section, it is attempted to compare the degree of 
openness in Sri Lanka with that of HPEs. For this, the study uses three indicators: trade 
share, export tariffs, and Gwartney et al (2000) openness index. The Figure 6.3 depicts 
the trade share of four countries. Initially, in 1960, Korea has had small percentage of 
trade while the others recorded high percentage of trade. Singapore has been one of the 
main trading posts of British colonial rule in East Asia which had created a strong trading 
system in the early 1960s. Both Sri Lanka and Malaysia are former British colonies. The 
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colonial rulers had built traditional agricultural sectors mainly: tea, rubber and coconut 
for exports. The higher trade share in these economies at the initial periods was stemming 
from their traditional dependence on primary commodities exports. One of the most 
notable features is that Figure 6.3 gives the impression that Korea has been far less open 
than Sri Lanka which is highly doubtful. It is well-known that Singapore, Korea, and 
Malaysia have been consistently following outward-oriented regimes for the past three 
decades even if they adopted gradual liberalization, whereas Sri Lanka being a late-comer 
to liberalization has experienced various regular interferences as well as continuation of 
many barriers to trade and investment. It is necessary to look into the other measures to 
determine the degree of openness in Sri Lanka and the comparators. 
 



















































Source: World Bank 2004.  
 
The tariff rate can be used to explain trade distortions. High export taxes likely to 
dampen export growth and thereby economic growth. The export tariff is one of the main 
sources of government revenue due to limitation of other taxable sources because of the 
poor state of the economy. Both Korea and Singapore have implemented zero tariffs on 
exports for the entire 1970-2000 period. On the other hand, Malaysia and Sri Lanka have 
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imposed tariff on exports around 11.5, 10, respectively (Table 6.3) for the entire 1970-
2000. However, both economies have gradually reduced export tariffs, and have come 
near to eliminating them. It is obvious that Singapore and Korea has facilitated exports by 
abolishing export-tariffs for the last three decades. This is an indication that Korea is far 
more liberalized than Sri Lanka.   
 
Table 6.3: Trade Distortions, Export Tariffs (% of Government’s Tax Revenue)  
Period Singapore Korea Malaysia Sri Lanka 
1970-74 0 0 15.59 13.29
1975-79 0 0 18.16 22.79
1980-84 0 0 14.87 22.83
1985-89 0 0 9.99 5.73
1990-95 0 0 6.40 1.39
1996-01 0 0 2.32 0.01
1970-01 0 0 11.57 10.22
Data Source: World Bank, WDI, 2004 
 
Alternatively, the openness index (TOI) recently developed by Gwartney at el 
(2000) is used to compare the degree of openness. The scores of the index range from 0 
to 10, where 10 means complete openness. The TOI is constructed by modeling trade 
share using both policy and non-policy components. The main elements of non-policy 
variables that affect the size of trade sector are: geographical size, extent of coastlines, 
the population of a nation, proximity to world demand, effective petroleum price shocks, 
and a control for potential GDP measurement bias in agrarian economies.  The policy 
variables included in the index are: tariffs, exchange rate controls, and controls on the 
movement and use of capital. The third component in the index is the relative openness of 
an economy’s nearest trading partners. The values of TOI for HPEs and Sri Lanka are 
reported in Table 6.4. All HPEs have had more liberalized policies than Sri Lanka since 
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1980s. Being a small economy, Singapore has been the most liberalized economy. Even 
if Sri Lanka is currently the most liberalized economy in South Asia, it is still far less 
liberalized than Singapore, Malaysia, and Korea.  
 
Table 6.4: Degree of External Openness: Trade Openness Index 
Country 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-2000 1980-2000 
Singapore 9.50 10.00 9.90 9.90 9.80
Korea 5.90 5.90 6.80 6.90 6.30
Malaysia 7.80 7.90 7.90 7.90 7.80
Sri Lanka 4.50 4.40 4.20 6.00 4.70
Source: Gwartney et al (2000). 
 
Sri Lanka is one of the late-comers to commence economic liberalization. It 
began to shift away from excessive intervention in the domestic economy, and 
international trade and investment by gradually reforming trade, investment and financial 
regimes in the late 1970s. Since then, the government has been deregulating, privatizing, 
and opening the economy to international competition. However, the liberalization 
process was not continued unhindered because there have been policy reversals, 
discontinuities, as well as rejections. Most studies with reference to Sri Lanka emphasize 
positive nexus between outward-orientation and export-expansion (Athukorala and 
Jayasuriya 1994, 2004, Athukorala and Rajapatirana 2000, Snodgrass 1998). In an 
exploration of the role of outward-orientation in industrial growth, Athukorala and 
Jayasuriya (2004) conclude that “an outward-oriented policy regime can yield a superior 
industrial outcome compared to a closed-economy regime, even under severe strains of 
political and macroeconomic instability.” However, most of these studies do not directly 
empirically test as to whether open trade policy has affected economic growth in Sri 
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Lanka. It is, therefore, expected to assess the empirical relationship between openness 
and economic growth in Sri Lanka, in a growth regression framework.  
 
6. 5. Government Institutions 
In this section, strengths of government institutions in Sri Lanka are reviewed. 
Historical experience suggests that it takes a longer time period for once a poorer country 
to transform itself into an affluent society, which in turn requires a long-term vision and 
commitment from the stake-holders of progress. In HPEs, the efforts for gaining or 
retaining government power have not created damaging effects on growth efforts in these 
economies. In many cases, governments appear to have had representations from all 
ethnic groups, labour unions, and other pressure groups making it a collective effort for 
maintaining rapid economic growth. This consequently provided a little scope for 
allegedly uncertain outcomes to devastate growth prospects. Consistency and continuity 
of policies have been guaranteed through this process. 
Compared to the HPEs, Sri Lanka’s experience is one of severe political 
instability for the last three decades. There has been no consensus on the ‘rules of the 
growth game’ (so to state as North 1997). Sri Lankan electorate has continuously elected 
two political groups to govern them in pursuit of the ‘magical growth formula’ 
throughout post-independent period. As a result, the policies were often subject to 
‘reversals’, ‘discontinuities’, ‘rejections’, as well as often they were implemented in a 
‘stop-and-go’ fashion. Sri Lanka has failed to design a state structure adequately 
accommodating the interests of all ethnic groups leading to violent conflict. Borrowed 
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ideologies rather than visionary endeavors appeared to have governed the decision 
making process.   
In order to identify the nature of institutions in Sri Lanka and comparators a 
number of indexes of government institutions used in the chapter three are employed.16 
The indexes should be treated as raw measures of the strengths of government 
institutions. However, due to the unavailability of alternative measures in time series 
basis there is no option other than to use these indicators to explain government 
institutions. The average scores of the indicators of government institutions are reported 
in Table 6.5. HPEs have maintained relatively conducive and higher quality government 
institutions for the past three decades. Japan, the paradigm case, has been able to 
establish and sustain institutional arrangements and domestic policies for supporting 
outward-oriented economy (Johnson 1982). Second, in Singapore, the state created and 
promoted key economic bureaucracies for facilitating market-oriented economy and 
openness (Evans 1995, Sours 1997) while government is playing a pro-active role in the 
growth process. Third, Malaysia created and sustained appropriate institutional 
arrangements through New Economic Policy introduced in 1970 (Ravenhill 1995). 
Malaysia has been able to create a ‘pro-growth government’ through a constitution and 
political agreement concentrating considerable power and developmental direction at the 
centre. This in turn has empowered politico-bureaucratic elite with relative 
developmental autonomy to develop the role of the state towards economic growth. 
Finally, South Korea has transformed itself from among the bottom of the poorest 
countries in 1950s into a one among the group of industrialized countries within less than 
                                                 
16 See Appendix 6.1 for details of the construction of the composite index as well as the 
description of the individual indexes. 
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five decades. The remarkable growth performance in Korea over the last three decades is 
attributed to outward-oriented strategy, market-friendly state interventions, human capital 
formation, and macro-historical forces and their dynamics as prerequisites for rapid 
growth (Balassa 1981). However, Korea’s development performance is not only a 
product of aforesaid factors, but also an outcome of political leadership (Bardhan 1993, 
Leftwich 1998) and conscious efforts by the government in creating and sustaining 
appropriate government institutions. 
 
Table 6.5: Strengths of Government Institutions: Separate Indexes 





















































































































Note: CUP-risk of corruption index, ROL-risk of rule of law index, BUQ-risk of 
bureaucratic quality index, EHT-risk of ethnic tensions index, RGC-risk repudiation of 
government contract index, EPR-risk of expropriation index. The values of CUP, ROL, 
BUQ, and EHT range from 0 to 6, while the values of RGC and EPR range from 0 to 10. 
The lowest score indicates the worse situation, and the highest score indicates the best 
situation.  
Source: Political Risk Services  
 
The scores of the indexes of incidence of corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic 
quality, and ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka have been remarkably lower than those of the 
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other three economies. Government institutions have been very weak in Sri Lanka 
compared to that of HPEs. Even if Sri Lanka has gradually taken measures to reduce 
expropriation risk and repudiation risk as a result of enhanced measures for economic 
liberalization, it has miserably failed to maintain law and order, manage ethnic divisions, 
improve the quality of bureaucracy, and reduce rent-seeking and wastage. This view is 
further confirmed by the scores of the composite index of government institutions (Table 
6.6). 
 
Table 6.6: Composite Index of Government Institutions 
Country 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-2000 1980-2000 
Singapore 5.43 5.11 5.15 5.50 5.29
Korea 5.55 4.33 4.64 5.31 4.95
Malaysia 4.29 3.55 3.85 4.74 4.11
Sri Lanka 2.54 2.28 2.48 3.90 2.80
Note: This index is a composite index of six of the institutional quality indexes, the 
scores of which range from 0 to 6, where zero is the worst and 6 is the best. 
 
The growth performance in Sri Lanka under different economic regimes 
highlights several features. The Table 6.7 reports average rate of growth of per-capita 
GDP during different political and economic regimes. First, the overall growth rate for 
the past four decades remained slow despite whoever governed and which policy regimes 
were practiced. Second, political turmoil appears to have affected growth. During 1983-
1989 there had been anti-government Sinhalese armed rebellion together with ethnic war 
which severely diluted growth. Third, the average growth rates during the market-
oriented and outward-oriented policy regimes were quite higher than in other periods. 
Finally, the average growth rate in Sri Lanka has been strictly less than that of Asia and 
Pacific region even though it has been higher than that of any other developing region. 
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Table 6.7: Growth Performance and Policy Regimes in Sri Lanka: Growth of Per-capita 






Domestic Policy Regime External Policy Regime 
1960-64 1.0 State-oriented Inward-oriented 
1965-69 3.1 Semi Market-oriented Semi Outward-oriented 
1970-76 1.6 State-oriented Inward-oriented 
1977-88 3.4 Market-oriented Outward- oriented  
1989-94 3.8 Market-oriented Outward-oriented  
1995-01 2.8 Market-oriented  Outward-oriented  
2002-03 3.8 Market-oriented Outward-oriented 
2004 - -- -- -- 
1960-01 2.7 -- -- 
Average Growth Rates in Regions 
1960-01 2.2 South Asia 
1960-01 5.3 East Asia and Pacific 
1960-01 1.6 Latin America & Caribbean 
1960-01 0.8 North Africa 
1960-01 0.2 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Data Source: World Bank, 2004, World Development Indicators, CD-ROM Version 
Note: The periods were divided according to political regimes in Sri Lanka.    
 
One of the most notable features of growth experience in Sri Lanka is its failure to 
sustain the growth momentums. Sri Lanka appeared to have experienced growth 
momentums approximately in three periods: 1966-69, 1978-86, and 1990-1996 according 
to growth of per-capita GDP, but failed to sustain these growth momentums. In 1970, 
new government introduced diametrically opposite economic strategies and policies in 
the form of strict import substitutions, stringent interventions into the domestic economic 
activities mainly motivated by anti-market perceptions to what was prevailing until then. 
Private economic activities were reduced to almost nothing during this period. During 
1980s, there has been severe social uprising, escalation of war, and breaking down of 
everyday life. Governments took various reactionary measures in the form of increasing 
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government spending resulting in severe macroeconomic problems. Some of these factors 
might have contributed to the failure to sustain growth momentums. 
 
6. 6. Determinants of Economic Growth: Regressions 
Regarding the case of Sri Lanka, studies directly analyzing the effects of 
government institutions, external openness, and political instability in economic growth 
in the framework of empirical growth regressions are basically lacking. This is seemingly 
due to the difficulty in quantifying the strengths of government institutions. For relating 
the cross-country empirical evidence to the case of Sri Lanka, this study examines the 
determinants of growth focusing on external openness and government institutions. The 
annual data for1960-2001 is used. All the values are in constant prices and the data are 
from World Bank (2004) unless otherwise specified. The following equation was 
empirically estimated. 
 
1t t t t t t t t ty a y l i d g x zα β γ σ τ ϕ δ ε−= + + + + + + + +  
where a  is the constant and ε is the white-noise error term.  
 
(1). y is the rate of growth of GDP. 
(2). Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP.  
(3). Openness is approximated by two indicators: average tariff rate; and a dummy 
variable that takes 1 during 1960-65 and 70-76 and zero otherwise is used (IO-
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Regime Dummy).17 During 1966-69 there has been a partially liberalized regime 
whereas during post-1977 period there was a liberalized regime.  
(4). To proxy government institutions, the 6-point composite index is used 
(5). An interaction term of government institutions and tariff rate is added.  
(6). In order to capture political instability, two dummy variables are added: (a) 
regime shift dummy variable that takes 1 for the years (1960, 1965, 1970, 1977, 
1989, 1994, and 2001) in which government change took place and zero 
otherwise; (b) twin-conflicts dummy variable which takes 1 for 1983-1989 and 
zero otherwise. 
(7). Annual rate of inflation expressed by consumer price index as a control variable 
to capture the macroeconomic instability experienced in Sri Lanka. 
 
In the first case, results of the determinants of growth of GDP are reported in 
Table 6.8.  For a growth regression, the model fit is notable ( 2R = 0.7689). A number of 
lags of the dependent variable were also used in the estimation to capture the possible 
simultaneity problem because poor growth performance might have affected institutions 
and openness. FDI positively impact on economic growth. The coefficient of average 
tariff rate is negative and significant. The IO-regime dummy is negative and significant.18 
The coefficient of the composite index of institutions is positive and significant. 
Moreover the interaction term of tariff rate and institutions index is negative and 
significant at the 1 percent level. Annual rate of inflation negatively affects economic 
                                                 
17 Athukorala (1999) first used this type of a dummy variable in his empirical study on 
export growth in Sri Lanka.  
18 When explaining the individual effects of trade share and government institutions, the 
effects of the interaction term was taken into consideration. 
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growth. Two dummy variables used to proxy political stability have negative signs but 
not significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Table 6.8: Determinants of GDP Growth Rate 
Explanatory Variable OLS-Estimator 
Constant 0.1101
(1.78)*
Foreign Direct Investment Inflows  0.9195
(2.08)*






Tariff Rate* Institutions Index -0.0149
(-2.07)*




Regime Shift Dummy -0.0013
(-0.27)
R-squared = 0.7689 
Durbin-Watson stat =2.3337 
Data period = 1960-2001 
Note: The numbers in the parenthesis are t values and “*” indicates that the 
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent levels. 
 
One of the possible problems of the regression results in 6.8 is the possibility of 
the presence of endogeneity of explanatory variables. In order to test for the robustness of 
the previous regression results, the above regression was re-estimated replacing growth of 
GDP with growth of per-capita GDP (Table 6.9). Again, the model fit is notable ( 2R = 
0.6891). The results are consistent with the previous regression.  
As a second robustness test, the model in Table 6.8 was re-estimated using only 
the lagged values of the explanatory variables. The results of individual lagged variables 
are not significant so that they are not reported here. 
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Table 6.9: The Determinants of Growth of GDP Per-capita in Sri Lanka 
Explanatory Variable OLS-Estimator 
Constant 0.0221 
(1.83)* 
Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 0.9290 
(2.10)* 
Average Tariff Rate -0.0539 
(-3.61)* 
IO-Regime Dummy -0.0215 
(-1.82)* 
Institutions Index 0.4667 
(3.22)* 
Tariff Rate* Institutions Index -0.0160 
(-2.21)* 
Annual Rate of Inflation -0.0268 
(-1.96)* 
Twin-conflicts Dummy -0.0019 
(-0.31) 
Regime Shift Dummy -0.0003 
(-0.08) 
R-squared = 0.6891 
Durbin-Watson stat =2.3235 
Data period = 1960-2001 
Note: The numbers in the parenthesis are t values and “*” indicates that the 
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent levels. 
 
6. 7. Concluding Remarks 
External openness and government institutions positively contribute to growth. 
The fact that Sri Lanka has maintained moderate growth rates even under severe political 
instability and institutional weaknesses indicate the positive role of the relatively 
outward-oriented policies followed by Sri Lanka for the last three decades. The results of 
this empirical exercise are consistent with the theoretical prediction and the cross-country 
empirical findings. 
The government of Sri Lanka ought to improve its institutions to facilitate the 
market-oriented economy. It is the responsibility of the government to create appropriate 
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institutional mechanisms as well as using better technologies to reduce corruption by 
increasing transparency. Lawlessness is one of the major political problems in Sri Lanka 
which has created lot of disincentives for growth. Institutional reforms are necessary to 
transform legal system of the country to best suit the market economy. Sri Lanka must 
take measures to improve the bureaucracy. Throughout the post-independent period, 
ethnic divisions have created severe strains. The government must take appropriate 
measures to resolve the ethnic conflict. In general, the government of Sri Lanka needs to 
improve the strengths of institutions and adopt greater external openness to support the 






























7. 1. Introduction 
In this chapter, the main findings of the study are summarized along with some 
policy implications for developing countries. This study examined two issues: (a) the 
impact of foreign official development assistance (FDA) on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows, and (b) the role of external openness and government institutions in 
stimulating economic growth. The policies for building and maintaining institutions are 
apparently important for making the market-economy well-functioning. The discussion in 
this chapter highlights some insights drawn from this exercise that are relevant for 
promoting economic growth in developing countries. One of the pioneers of ‘policy 
economics’, Harberger (1999), for instance, once said “. . . no one can deny that when it’s 
bad enough, economic policy can certainly ruin an economy. And if bad economic policy 
can ruin the economy, good economic policy can certainly correct it. . . The role of 
economists . . . is for us to represent economic knowledge in the councils of government 
and in debates about policies in all kinds of forums. Policy decisions about economic 
matters should be built on what we have learned and it is our job to see that the voice of 
sound economics is heard by those who make decisions”.  
 
7. 2. Improving the Incentive Structure for Attracting FDI   
The third chapter empirically examined the impact of FDA on FDI inflows 
together with the other key determinants of FDI inflows in a cross-country setup using 
panel techniques. The results can be summarized as follows. There is no significant 
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relationship between aggregate FDA and FDI inflows. However, a more disaggregated 
analysis suggest that multilateral FDA negatively impact on FDI inflows, whereas 
bilateral FDA positively impact on FDI inflows. The strengths of overall incentive 
structure formed by better infrastructure, greater external openness, and strong 
institutions are crucial for an economy to be a magnet for FDI inflows. In light of these 
results, what can the developing countries do to improve and strengthen incentive 
structure? 
The countries relying on multilateral FDA are seemingly a less focus for FDI 
inflows. Foreign investors may be using multilateral FDA as a signaling devise to 
discover the nature of economic conditions in the host economies. In fact, developing 
countries with weak institutions and severe macroeconomic problems often seek FDA 
from bilateral and multilateral sources since foreign private investment is not adequately 
forthcoming for such economies. Most often such developing countries turn to 
multilateral organizations for official financial assistance in the form of grants or loans. 
When a country is extensively seeking multilateral FDA it may signal that overall 
economic environment is not conducive in such economies, and hence they are not safe 
investment destinations. This implies developing countries must reduce reliance on 
foreign public sources for financing development. Notwithstanding, it is generally the 
practice in most developing countries to divert FDA into various non-productive 
activities as well as government consumption thereby creating inefficiencies in the 
market allocation. As a result, most developing countries which rely on multilateral FDA 
attract less FDI and maintain poor economic growth.   
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The advanced economies seeking to promote overseas private investment aimed 
at long-term sustainability of development may be using FDA as an instrument to 
promote trade and investment relations with the host economies. Bilateral FDA is not 
merely an outcome of altruistic motives by the donors, but it is a channel through which 
future trade and investment relations are built for harnessing long-term benefits to the 
investment originating economies. Since FDI is seemingly beneficial for both the parent 
and the host economies, developing countries can possibly utilize FDA to improve the 
overall incentive structure creating favorable conditions for FDI inflows as well as for 
fostering economic growth.  
Extensive trade and investment requires advanced infrastructure facilities such as 
roads, rail lines, sea ports, airports, and reliable sources of energy at reasonable prices. If 
infrastructure is weak, goods cannot be transported rapidly, production is disrupted, and 
the supply chain collapses. On top of these, information and communications are central 
elements of well-functioning markets. In contemporary global markets, if companies lack 
reliable communications, they cannot operate. The results of the present study imply that 
developing economies can apparently increase government investment to improve the 
infrastructure facilities for attracting FDI. 
The results of the study are also indicative of the importance of improving the 
strengths of government institutions and adopting more open external economic policies 





7. 3. Promoting Growth: Institutions and External Openness 
The role of government institutions and external openness in economic growth 
was explained in three analytical chapters. A three sector model showed that external 
openness and government institutions spillover positive externalities and thereby 
contribute to economic growth. Empirical evidence from cross-country as well as the 
case study of Sri Lanka strongly supports this claim. Furthermore, external openness and 
strong government institutions also appear to contribute to economic growth by reducing 
rent seeking and fostering innovations. The results indicate that there may be feedbacks 
between external openness and government institutions. When greater openness and 
weak institutions combined, there is likely to be negative feedbacks between them. On 
the other hand, when strong institutions and no openness combined, there is likely to be 
negative feedbacks. The general conclusion emerging from these findings is that the 
economies with strong institutions and greater openness tend to grow faster. 
The Figure 7.1 depicts the relationships between external openness, government 
institutions and economic growth. It shows that greater openness and strong institutions 
individually as well as collectively affect economic growth, whereas there are feedbacks 
between openness and institutions. One of the relevant questions is why greater external 
openness by itself or strong government institutions by themselves not sufficient for 
sustained economic growth in developing countries. Conversely, it is important to ponder 
why a system with strong institutions and greater openness is more conducive for rapid 





Even though government builds and maintains strong institutions, economies with 
protectionist policies possess a number of disincentives. Strong institutions may facilitate 
domestic competition, but it cannot provide necessary foreign competition for the 
domestic businesses to thrive when it adopts protectionist policies. Most of the countries 
in the world are relatively small economies requiring them the access to foreign markets 
to increase production of which they have competitive advantages entailing the adoption 
of greater openness. There is no guarantee whether the economies with strong institutions 
are capable of sustained production of intermediate as well as capital goods necessary for 
expanding and diversifying industrial sectors without openness. Lack of openness may 
impede import of necessary intermediate as well as capital goods retarding the long-term 
sustainability of growth. Developing countries may not be able to undertake the level of 
innovations required for sustained economic growth without the benefits of foreign 
knowledge and technology. The open economies tend to attract much FDI providing 
them with opportunities for acquiring FDI-related technology. Small economies with 
Government 
External Openness Institutions 
Economic Growth 
Figure 7.1: Openness and Institutions as Complementary Determinants 
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restricted external economic policies hardly have the access to international technology. 
Moreover, foreign competition makes domestic dynamic businesses to continuously 
engage in innovations to be competitive in the market. Weak government institutions 
would not result in lowering information costs, helping risk-spreading, and lowering rent-
seeking activities. This may also have negative effects on openness. In the long run, lack 
of openness is likely to cause the government institutions to decay.19 This may 
subsequently cause overall economic conditions to deteriorate leading to severe economic 
hardships. As a result, there is a greater possibility for developing countries to sustain 
higher growth when they adopt a growth strategy consisting of greater openness 
alongside strong institutions.  
On the other hand, greater openness without strong institutions creates a number 
of disincentives. Institutions are necessary to maintain rule of law assuring political 
stability for the markets to function effectively. Businesses cannot thrive under anarchy. 
Greater openness may provide opportunities for firms to abuse their dominant positions 
in the absence of domestic regulatory institutions such as competition laws. Greater 
openness without strong institutions of property rights undermines the potentials for 
business expansion. Economic decisions cannot be implemented effectively if there are 
no clearly defined rules and regulations to own and transfer prosperities. In the absence 
of strong government institutions for social insurance or social safety nets, greater 
openness may result in social and political unrests emanating from deprivation of 
economic benefits. Without strong institutions for managing political conflicts, greater 
openness would not provide an ideal environment for growth since political conflicts 
                                                 
19 One may want to believe that former communist regimes collapsed mainly due to their 
failure to sustain strong institutions because of the lack of external openness. 
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devastate the business environment. Differences arising from ethnic, religious, or 
regional sources need to be managed. Accordingly, greater openness by itself or strong 
institutions by themselves does not seemingly create an ideal environment for strong 
growth. Government institutions and external openness are complementary determinants 
of growth.  
When countries adopt greater openness and strong institutions, there is likely to 
be mutually reinforcing positive feedbacks between them. In this context, one may want 
to wonder as to what the developing countries do in order to create an economic system 
with greater openness and strong institutions for them to be complementary determinants 
of growth. Plausibly, the best strategy to be adopted by the developing countries to foster 
growth is to gradually and sequentially liberalize the economies together with building 
and maintaining strong institutions. In other words, trade reforms and institutional 
reforms should be undertaken concurrently as a single process.  
There are many instances where economic liberalization takes place alongside 
domestic liberalization and institutional reforms. Recent bilateral liberalization exercises 
have taken up the issues related to domestic liberalization and institutional reforms along 
with external liberalization. To obtain the accession to World Trade Organization (WTO) 
also requires various institutional reforms at the domestic frontier such as: non-
discrimination in trade and industrial policies; transparency in publication of trade rules; 
and WTO-consistent patent and copyright protection. Moreover, accession to European 
Union also requires the adoption of wide-ranging legal and bureaucratic requirements 
within the individual countries. But, developing countries must adopt external 
liberalization, domestic liberalization and institutional reforms concurrently as a single 
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process not merely because of the external demands but because there are strong 
economic evidence supporting the positive role of strong government institutions and 
greater openness in fostering economic growth. The following specific policy matters 
relevant for enhancing the role of external openness and government institutions in 
developing countries are noted. 
Government ought to undertake institutional reforms alongside external 
liberalization for managing trade policy. The management of external trading systems of 
individual countries has become more complex and difficult to undertake given the new 
economic environment. Economic liberalization demands increasing trade policy 
management capacity at the individual country level in terms of building and maintaining 
institutions such as well-equipped trade and industry ministries, export development 
boards, and permanent foreign trade missions to manage external trading system. 
Governments must build and maintain domestic regulatory institutions alongside 
external liberalization. Greater openness demands accompanying institutional reforms to 
create a competitive business environment in the domestic economy. There must be 
conditions for local competition for providing the basis for more dynamic businesses to 
grow. Adequate degree of liberalization in the domestic economy should gradually and 
sequentially be undertaken. There is a greater probability for industries to thrive when 
government offers no protection from fair competition and sets tough technical and 
regulatory standards. Letting businesses to operate in a sloppy environment by various 
protections often impedes innovations.   
Institutions must be built and maintained for ensuring rule of law. Political 
stability is crucial for the openness to be effective. Businesses cannot thrive when 
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anarchy rules the business transactions. The creation of transparent legislative and 
judicial institutions is important for private economic activity. Political neutrality of law 
enforcement institutions has to be established. Accountability and transparency of law 
enforcement mechanisms have to be introduced, monitored and enforced. Moreover, 
disputes about the form of the state in multi-ethnic societies often generate violent 
conflicts worsening economic environment thereby retarding the potentials for growth. 
Divisions emanating from ideological, ethnic, religious, and regional lines must be 
managed. This may sometimes require reforming the most fundamental institution of a 
country; the State. The nature of the state needs to be determined to accommodate the 
interests of various ethnic groups.  
Legal and institutional mechanisms must be established together with 
liberalization to safeguard rights of physical, human, and knowledge properties. Clearly 
defined property rights are essential for the openness to be effective. If individuals have 
proper incentives they will behave in ways which enrich both themselves and the rest of 
the society. The core of the matter is the right to own and exchange all forms of 
properties. It shields property owners from the power of the government to grant 
privileges to special interest groups.  
External liberalization demands effective system of public administration. 
Improving public administration by increasing transparency, meritocratic recruitment, 
and removing excessive red-tape is vital for healthy functioning of the open economies. 
Meritocratic recruitment increases the likelihood of at least minimal competence. The 
improved public administration often reduces transaction and information costs and 
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enhances both domestic as well as foreign private investment facilitating rapid economic 
growth. 
Institutions of social safety nets ought to be built and maintained. External 
liberalization is likely to create negative consequences for some quarters of the society 
entailing new institutions to provide social safety nets. Economic liberalization often 
paves the way for job loses in some industries necessitating institutional mechanisms to 
safeguard the people who lost jobs during the adjustment periods. Moreover, external 
liberalization makes the skills of some of the workers obsolete necessitating new 
institutions to facilitate retraining programmes to upgrade the skills. When there are no 
institutions to provide social safety nets, severe resistance tend to arise from the social 
fabric against enhanced openness.      
Institutional reforms should be undertaken in the labour market together with 
extensive external liberalization. Impediments in the labour markets often discourage 
investment, dampen business potentials, and retard growth. Deregulation of labour 
markets in poor economies is essential. Severe resistance arising from industrial unions 
often dampens management of external economic policies. Institutions must be built and 
maintained for settlement of industrial disputes in the liberalized environment.  
Capital market reforms in an open economy will also help to support dynamism in 
increasing investment. This will require reforming institutions in the financial system. 
Relatively open capital markets help developing countries to lessen depending on FDA. 
With enhanced openness, there may be a greater potential for the developing countries to 
attract long-term foreign private investment. 
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 Since people generally respond to incentives, governments in developing 
countries can create right conditions for the market system to function effectively by 
implementing correct domestic policies, adopting greater external openness, and building 
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Appendix-3.1: Plot of Scatter and a 
Nearest Neighbor Fit between 
aggregate FDA and FDI 
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Appendix 3.2: Classification of Legal Systems used as IVs 
 
Country Classification of Legal System IV Variable (observations) 
Sri Lanka English Common Law Tradition (1) 1
India English Common Law Tradition (1) 1
Pakistan English Common Law Tradition (1) 1
Bangladesh English Common Law Tradition (1) 1
Malaysia English Common Law Tradition (1) 1
Indonesia French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Thailand English Common Law Tradition (1) 1
Philippines French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Singapore English Common Law Tradition (1) 1
South Korea German Civil Law Tradition (3) 3
Hong Kong English Common Law Tradition (1) 1
Botswana French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Kenya English Common Law Tradition (1) 1
Congo, Rep. French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Zimbabwe English Common Law Tradition (1) 1
Senegal French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Egypt French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Madagascar French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Brazil French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Argentina French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Bolivia French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Chile French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Colombia French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Mexico French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Venezuela French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Peru French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Cameroon French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Costa Rica French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Ecuador French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Guatemala French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Paraguay French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2
Uruguay French Civil Law Tradition (2) 2






Appendix 3.3: Description of Data 
Foreign direct investment: The net FDI as share of GDP is used. Net FDI does not 
mean outward FDI is subtracted from inward FDI, rather it means that sum of equity 
capital, re-investment of earnings, other long-term capital as shown in balance of 
payments. This means net increases in assets or net decreases in liabilities are recorded as 
debits (recorded with a negative sign in the balance of payments). Hence, FDI flows with 
a negative sign indicate that at least one of the three components of FDI (equity capital, 
reinvested earnings or intra-company loans) is negative and not offset by positive 
amounts of the remaining components. In this sense, these data represent gross FDI 
inflows. Data is collected from the CD-ROM version of the World Development 
Indicators 2002, for the period from 1978 to 2001. To control for the size of the 
economy, FDI is expressed as share of GDP.  
Foreign Development Assistance (FDA): Aggregate FDA as share of GDP; bilateral 
FDA as share of GDP; and multilateral FDA as share of GDP are used. The data are 
collected from OECD (various years). The raw data were transformed into US dollar 
values using 1980 exchange rates.    
Market size: Per capita income is used as a proxy for the domestic market size. The data 
are from the CD-ROM version of the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002). 
The GDP is used as an alternative measure of market size. 
Infrastructure: The government investment on infrastructure can be used as a proxy 
(International Monetary Fund, 2001). Each spending variable is reported as share of real 
GDP. Government spending on: (a) transportation and communication, (b) economic 
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affairs and services, (c) housing and community amenities, and (d) general public 
services are available. These variables are used to represent the infrastructure.  
Wage cost: The variable is constructed in the following manner: average wage in a 
country divided by weighted average of average wage in OECD countries (World Bank 
2002). The included OECD countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxemberg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
and United States of America. 
Openness: Trade share index is computed as export plus imports divided by GDP. The 
data is from World Bank (2002). 
Quality of labour: adults’ literacy rate and infant mortality rate are used to denote 
education and health care as possible proxies for the quality of human capital. The data 






















Appendix 5.1: Derivation of Some Important Relations 
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Since the long-run growth of the economy is driven by innovations, we have RLA
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Denoting growth rate of the economy by *y and since *A C y
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Derivation of 5.23: 
Free entry into research sector implies that wage payments to workers of R&D sector, 
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Derivation of equation 5.31: 
In order to obtain the equilibrium level of labour in the institutions-building sector, 
substitute for ,R LL L  and XL into (5.30); 
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Derivation of equation 5.40:  
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Appendix 6.1: Construction of the Composite Index of Government 
Institutions  
A number of indexes of government institutions developed by Political Risk Services 
were used. The data were bought online from www.countrydata.com. The individual 
indexes are as follows. 
Rule of Law Index: 
Rule of law index (ROL) reflects the degree to which the citizens of the country are 
willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate 
disputes.  The scores of the index ranges from 0 to 6 in which 0 represent complete 
lawlessness and 6 represent highest rule of law. Higher scores indicate sound institutions, 
a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of government power.  
Lower scores indicate a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle 
claims. 
The Index of Corruption: 
The index of corruption (CUP) in government: means that the lower scores indicate a 
greater number of government officials are likely to demand special payments and that 
illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government in the 
form of bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessment, police protection, or loans. The higher scores indicate lower corruption while 
lower scores indicate higher corruption. 
The Quality of Bureaucracy Index: 
The quality of the bureaucracy  index (BUQ): is defined in such a way that high scores 
indicate existence of established mechanism for recruitment and training, autonomy from 
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political pressure, and strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy 
or interruptions in government services when governments change. This index also 
ranges from 0 to 6 where 6 is highest quality of bureaucracy.  
The Ethnic Tensions Index: 
The ethnic tensions index (EHT) measures the degree of tension within a country 
attributable to racial, ethnicity, or language divisions.  Lower ratings are given to 
countries where racial and ethnic tensions are high because opposing groups are 
intolerant and unwilling to compromise. The scores of this index also range from 0 to 6.  
The Index of the Repudiation of Government Contracts: 
The risk of repudiation of contracts by government index (RGC): addresses the 
possibility that foreign businesses, contractors, and consultants face the risk of a 
modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling 
down due to an income drop, budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in 
government, or a change in government economic and social priorities.  Lower scores 
signify a greater likelihood that a country will modify or repudiate a contract with a 
private business. The scores of this index range from 0 to 10. 
The Index of Risk of Expropriation: 
The risk of expropriation of private property index (EPR): evaluates the risk of outright 
confiscation and forced nationalization of private property. The scales of this index range 
from 0-10, with higher values indicating better ratings, i.e. less risk.  
The Composite Index: 
The composite index: a 6-point composite index of government institutions is created 
using these indexes. The index is created in the following manner: 
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This composite index specifies that the higher scores indicate that there are strong 
government institutions. Lower scores indicate that the government institutions are very 
weak.  
 
 
 
